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CHAPTER I 
PROPOSITIONS A�D METHODOLOGY 
Introductio� 
The purpose of this thesis is t o  a na lyze the development , 
causes , objectives a nd future of the Pa lestine Res ista nce Movement. 
The s tudy presents s everal original propos itions concetning the 
extent to which the Pales t inian Res istance is a s el f- contained 
movement. The Res istance Movement came a bout as  a consequence of 
political a nd s ocio-economic circumsta nces , having its own well ­
d efined values a nd g oa l s , enj oying recognition of its viability 
a mong the Pa lestinian a nd Arab populat ion, a nd might be affecting 
the future of Isra el . The a nalysis combines subs t a ntive informa ­
tion on the Pales t ine Res ista nce Movement with a behavioral a nd 
theoretical approach to the phenomenon of res i s ta nce. 
Propos itions 
The discus s i on concentrates on the following propos itions: 
1. The conventional wisdom in the literature on res is t a nce 
a nd viol ence suggests that it is structural inequalities a nd u nrepre­
sentative government that provoke al ienated groups i n  s ociety to view 
the government as illegitimate. In s ome cases , however , it may be 
that alienated groups view the state a nd the political sys tem themselves 
1 
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as  illegitima t e .  Tnis may have been the cas e  of the Palestinians 
of Israel who stayed in Israel a fter the 1947-1948 wa r ,  those on 
the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip which 
became a part of Israel in 1967, and those Palest inians who are 
livin3 in exile. It was the initial view of the Palestinians that 
the new Israeli government was illegitima t e  because they s a w  the 
state of Israel a s  ill egitima te. This ill egitima cy rendered the 
Israeli government unrepresenta tive in the eyes of the Pal estinians . 
2 .  If a political sys t em t ends to  restrain certain groups 
from a cquiring equa l rights and status , and keeps other groups from 
participating in,  or l eft outside the sys t em ,  the impact of such an 
arrangement is tension resulting from a breakdown of communica tion 
bet ween the existing government and the al ienated groups. When the 
tens ion becomes uncontrollable, violence is l i kely to occur. The 
Palestinian Ara bs (willingly or unwil l ingly, whether based on reason, 
l ogic , or emot ions ) have d is a s s oc ia t ed thems elves from the Israeli 
pol i tical sys t em. Their a t titudes toward those whom they cons ider 
the s ources of their probl ems have become a tt i tudes of hate, revenge 
and violence. Revenge and violence may not be carried out if an 
existing regime is considerably repress ive, but as a general rule, 
violence may flare up a t  any moment , since a l l  other channels of 
communica tions are closed. 
3. Shared goals bring a group's factions clos er t ogether and 
s trengthen them, ma king the pursuit of their goa l s  more effec tive; 
but contradicting a pproaches and ideologies may weaken the organiza­
tion and s pl it it a part , c onsequently rendering its goals unreacha bl e .  
The Pal es t inian organiza tions may be vie� �s of such internal frac-
") .J 
turing becaus e of the variety of a pproaches to  real izing the ir common 
goa l .  
4 .  Passive or ac tive group resistance may be the outcome of 
politica l ,  social and economic inequa lities , social change, and fDil-
ures of members 0£ the group to accommodate t hemselves by other 1.1c;;:1s. 
Although a l l  of t�e a bove mentioned criteria can provide the neccss�ry 
momentum for v iolence, s ome other highly-va lued goal such as country-
identity may overshadow a l l  other t hings and call for a rmed resistance 
of which c ons equences are not defined. This is true for the Pales t in-
ians . To the Palestinian, t he homeland l ies in the c enter of his 
basic exis tence and its l os s  renders life meaningless .  The a s s ert ion 
of his right t o  make his life meaningful (fighting to regain his country-
identity) is most l ikely to genera t e  c ha ins of vioi ent events . These 
events may lead to goal a tt a inment , a bolit ion of the group, perpeb1at ion 
of the existing state of affairs, or a c ompromis e. 
5 .  Organized armed resistance arises to  accomplish s pecific 
goa l s .  Consequently, counter-res istance is a imed a t  quieting the forces 
of resistance and dismantling their s ources of su pport . 
The Pa l es t inian Arabs are convinced t ha t  t heir tactics of a rmed 
resistance in fighting Israel are the only effective ways t o  1 1libera te11 
Palestine. The Israelis react by a ttacking the bases of Palestinians 
in their hos t c ountries , threatening the host countries , and put t ing 
more pressures and controls on"the Palestinian people who l iv e  within 
the geogra phj.c limits of Israel . 
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!laving outlined the general points of discuss io n ,  let us nm.; 
look a t  the prob l em and s ee how a Palestinian feels . 
Background 
110ne day spent in the slums of a big city should have suffice<l11 1 
to  make one (any one who l ives in better conditions) aware o f  the per-
petual s t a t es o f  disappointments , frus tration, anger and grudge that 
a re held by slum dwell ers against the sys t em. 
To the Palestinians , the loss of their homeland caused them to 
l ive in slums. Not only does the idea o f  l iving in the slums as ·  such, 
crea te thes e f eelings of hostility, but the loss of their homeland 
over which they did not ca s t  a vote reinfo rces these feel ings . L iving 
in the slums in a l i en countries represents the a bs ence o f  access to 
the political sys t ems (except in Jordan where Palest inians have limited 
access)  in the host countries . The non-existent pol it ical a chievements 
work as a constant reminder of lack of power and pres t ige,  as wel l as 
of the idea that the res toration of power and p res tige can come a bout 
only by rega ining Palestine. The uniqueness o f  the Palestinian prob-
lem is easily recognized . 
"His Majes ty ' s  Government views with favor the estab­
l ishment i.n Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate 
the a chievement of this object, it being clearly under­
s tood that nothing shall b e  done to p rejud ice the civil 
and religious rights o f  the existing non-Jewish conununi­
t i es· in Pales tine.112 
Th is is wha t  is known as the Balfour Decla ra tion of  1917 , which 
came twenty yea rs a f t er the Zionist Movement made its a im in Palestine 
5 
c l ea r. By t!'le end of World War I ,  Palestine beca r.1e a British r.ianda�e, 
and the Jewish im.1-iigra t ion to Pales tine increased more than ever. The 
Balfour Dec la ra t ion, coupled -with the inflow o f  immigrants to Pales tine, 
ala rmed the Palestinian A rabs . They de�onstrated their diss atisfaction 
in many pro t ests against the British rule and the newcomers. Frorr. 1920 
until 19 3 9 ,  the protests o f  the Palestinians never stopped; nor di� the 
jc�ish immigra t ion to Pales tine, o r  the a ctivities of the militant 
Zionist o rganiza tions cease aga inst the indigenous A ra b  population of 
3 
Pa les t ine . The conflict between the Pa lestinian Arabs and the Zionists, 
after World Wa r II, was heightened and as a consequence , the British 
Government handed bac k  its manda te over Palestine to the United Na t ions 
saying that it could no longer cope with the s itua t ion. 4 
At the t ime of the Balfour Declara t ion in 1917, the Palestinian 
Ara b population cons isted o f  nine-tenths o f  the total popu l a t ion o f  
Palestine and owned a bout fifty-six percent o f  the land. The Jewish 
population was e ight percent and owned two and one-half percent o f  the 
land. In 1947, a fter thirty years o f  Jewish immigra tion to Palestine, 
the Palest inian Arabs formed s ixty-nine percent of the popula t ion and 
fo�ty-seven percent of the land, and the Jewish population thirty-one 
percent and fifteen percent respectively. 5 (The land that is not 
a c counted fo r was the p ro pe rty of the British Government - -the Mandato ry 
Government a t  the time . )  
Preceded by the failure o f  the United Na tions to find a solu-
t io n  acceptable to bot h  parties to the dispute, the British forces 
withdrew from Palestine in mid-1948 leaving the country in utter 
6 
confusion. Consequently, the militant Zionist organizations spread 
their terrorist a c tivities to encompass the whole Palestinian Arab 
population . As a resul t ,  the Prles tinian Arabs were forced to aban-
don the land tha t their fathers and forefathers o wned and grew on . 
Individuals and collectivities fled out o f  the country a fter they 
were terrorized physically and psychologica lly; many were massacred 
6 
and tortured . The waves o f  �ulestinians seeking refuge in the 
ne ighboring countries found themselves firs t  shelterless , and later 
l iving in shacks , tents , and slums facing very poor economic and 
health conditions . All of that, coupled with diso riented and dis -
integrated social life , was thought o f  as  the consequences o f  home-
lessness . The Pa les tinian felt deeply that with the loss o f  his 
homeland lay the loss of his identity and his honor. His pride and 
dignity were hurt and he was l o wered in s t a tus and prestige. Every 
one o f  the a bove mentioned effects might have been enough to generate 
in the Pa les tinian a tremendous impetus to revolt against the realities 
with which he is a lways living,  and consequently a t ta c k  t he Zionist 
s t a te as  the symbol of these rea lities. 
As the situation presently stands, one may view the problem 
as a parad igm of group-conflict outside the constitutional framework 
in this manner: 
If there exists two groups ,  A and B, in one area o r  country 
that a re diametrically opposed to each o ther's orientations and phil o -
sophies with no pe rceived pos s i bility o f  a compromise; and 
If one of these groups , say group A ,  comes to power by force 
and cons equently controls the natural and human resources of the areas; 
then, 
Since group A came to rule through coercive means , group B 
mus t�surrender, go into exile , or seek refuge. Th is could happen 
without group B a bandoning its principles , and consequently its 
viewing the order of A as il legitimate. Accordingly, group B �ay 
never stop resisting the form� shape, or substance o f  group A ' s 
dominance wherever it exists. However ,  the methods that·�roup B 
chooses to follow may vary according to its determination and the 
potentials o f  the ava ilable means under its disposa l .  
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If a rmed resistance comes to the forefront, then counter­
resistance fo llows . Armed resistance may not substantia lly endanger 
the existence o f  a very s t rong and well-es t a blished system, but it may 
annoy and divert the system ' s  efforts from develo pment and growth to 
maintenance o f  the existing ins t itutions . This sort of retardation 
created by resistance to the system calls for counter-res istance by 
the existing government: Counter-resistance may be very effective in 
suppress ing the forces o f  resi�tance �emporarily, but if it ultimately 
fails to quiet them, the system has to come to terms with these forces 
in the end. 
Methodology 
In addition to discussing the propositions described a bove, 
the s tudy discusses the extent to which the Palestinian resistance: 
(a) Is a sel f-conta ined movement ,  created by the social , eco­
nomic , and political cond itions of the Pa l es t inian people; 
(b) Possesses its o�n well -defined values and goals and has 
moved toward ful fill ing these goals; 
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(c) Enjo1� �ccognition of its viability a mong the Pal esti�icin 
and Ara b population, and; 
(d) Mi6ht be a ffecting the future of Israel. 
Th is study uses United 'Na tion� data , re��rts publ ished by 
United States Government Agencies, reports and studies of the Rand 
Corpora tion, publ icat ions of the Palest�ne Libera tion Organization . 
Research Center, and official announce�ents of spokes�en of the 
Movemen t ,  a s  well a s  some secondary sources in analysis of these 
propositions. 
The United Na t ions data contain statistical informa tion a bout 
the l ife conditions of the Pal estinian refugees, that is, the socio­
economic condition s .  The United States documentary publication s ,  wh ich 
include a ttitude survey , deal with the political , socia l ,  and economic 
a spects of the Palestinians. The Rand Corporat ion reports and studies 
describe some of the a spect under which the Pal estinian Resistance 
Movement came a bout , with d iscussions a bout the role Palestinians play 
in the Middl e East crisis . The publicat ions of the Pal estine L i bera t i on 
Organizat ion Resea rch Center d escribe the d evel opment of the problem 
u sing raw data about events and conditions t�a t  have contributed t o  the 
present situa t i on .  The announcements of the officia l spokesmen of the 
Movement spell out the results of the actions of the Movement and the 
imp l ications for the future. 
This material on the Pa lestine Resistance Movement provid e s  
the bul k  o f  the information needed t o  show how the l iberat ion movement 
arose and is supported by the entire Palest inian population. 
9 
The study thus combines substantive �nformation on the Pale­
s t inian Resistance Movement w ith a b ehavioral and theoretical a p proach 
to the phenomenon of �es istance. 
The conclusions on the val idity of the proposit ions will be 
brought to3ethcr "in an effort to formulate some more general proposi­
tions on (1) res istance as a political phenomenon, (2) the socio­
economic det erminants of resistance, and (3) the prospects for organ­
ized a rmed resistance to accomp lish its goals. 
1 0  
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CHAPTER II 
RESISTANCE: WHY AND WHEN IT OCCURS 
Introduction 
For most Western newspapers, magazines, journa l s ,  and 
commentators, the members o f  the Palestine Resistance Movement are 
terrorists, blood-thirsty rebels, fanatic nationals, and individuals 
whose irrationality is their common ground . They call themselves 
the resistance movement, the freedom fighters, and the l iberators o f  
the homeland whose cause i s  consciously denied. Between what they 
are called and what tney call themselves there exists wide differences 
in values and cha racteristics. Regardless, the Palestinians seem to 
be determined to expand and perpetuate their actions until the p resent 
situation changes. But whether their a ctions w il l  end tomorrow or will 
never cease , their Movement, interna t ionally recognized a t  least in 
underground circles, w a s  never the first and probably will not be 
the last . 
A quick look a t  the history o f  the world during the last two 
hundred years i s  enough to show us that resistance is not a phenomenon 
o f  recent years or a monopoly o f  one region or another. A lthough resist­
ance i s  normal , it is circumstantial and varies in dimensions and forms 
from one country to anocher. 
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The Twentieth Century and the post World War II era in parti­
cular have �xperienced many incidents which coul� be termed as ranging 
from mild to violent resistance. These experiences have taken the 
form of political protests, wars of liberation or independence, or 
revolutions. Therefore, political resistance may be defined a s  an 
opposition, passive, underground or overt, by individuals who share. 
common principles and outlooks, who get together informa lly and, a s  
t ime passes, may become a n  organized group or groups operating from 
w i thin or without a political system, with the goal of li�icing or 
changing certain policies governing the system. In case of armed 
resistance , the resisting groups' potential goal is doing away with 
the system and substituting their own. The magnitude of resistance, 
then, is determined by (1) the degree of popular support for the goals 
of the resisting groups; (2) the �eans available t o  execute their 
threats; and (3) the degree of repression (and its psychol ogical 
repercussions) launched aga inst them by the existing order, including 
a perce ived denial of their rightful demands. 
Thinkers and philosophers such a s  Pla to, Aristotle ,  Aquinas, 
Moore , Locke , Hobbes, Bodin and many others, tried to systema tize the 
best type of govern�ents and social orders for the happiness of man­
kind . A t  the present there are some p ioneer theorists whose concern 
is t o  contribute to people's well -being in searching into the causes 
and effects of disruptions of public l ife in both developed and develop­
ing nations, so that some beneficial conceptions can be learned from 
them. However, with diverse emphasis, their research and writings 
13 
show that psychological, soc ial , economic and pol it ical factors arc 
the components of ?Cople's upri s ings.1 Al though there are �u�erous 
theories about protest, violence, and revolutions, this paper deals 
�ith a few theorists and parts of their interpretations which seem 
important to the analysis of this top i c .  
Some Conternoorary Interpretations of Resis tance 
In any serious conflict s ituations which may arise, one 
essential question would be posed; it is that o f  legitimacy . Nieburg 
s ays that the legitimacy o f  a government is reflected in a consensus 
among the population; that is,  the s t ate government and institut ions 
are mere representations o f  people's values and expectations . 2 The 
implication of Nieburg ' s  interpretation o f  l egit imacy is that when a 
government loses its legitimacy, it  loses its s t abil ity agains t ris ing 
dis content of  the people. This discontent may be manifested by diverse 
methods of res is tance to the government and its philosophy, which would 
consist of chaotic interactions in general, and may ultimately lead to 
structural changes. 
Talking about American experiences in general and about the 
influence o f  po:itical equality and consent in particular, Robert Dahl 
argues, 11 • • •  traditional institutionalized inequal ities tend to create 
all the conditions needed for a perfect s e l f -ful f il l ing prophecy: 
polit ical weakness leads to continued political weakness , and s t rength 
to cpntinucd s t rcngth . 1 1 3 It can be logically assumed that Dahl's pro­
position ,  based on t�e American minorities' experiences, could be 
interpreted as arguing that the relationship which exists between 
weakness and strength is that of polarization. Polarization does 
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not make the alienated group agree with the alienating group's 
policies but rather causes them to disagree (the range of this dis­
agreement could be anywhere between mild and sharp). Therefore, 
the outcome of this disagreement would be based on how large the 
alicntated group is, whether it could be organized, and the methods 
it is ready to employ to gain its ends, and, lastly, what means it 
has at its disposal. Dahl then argues that the degree of practical 
equality which exists imposes the degree of consent which exists, 
which in turn determines the intensity of any disagreements under 
basic control by the system. If the degree of practical equality is 
great, then the result can be a stable political system and a natural 
social order, and if not, tense and strained political and social 
orders will prevail. 
People, whether individuals, groups, or society, have values, 
Jspirations, and goals to pursue. Goals may not be achieved for differ­
ent reasons, aspirations may wither away, and consequently the goal­
pursuer is in a state of depression. Frustration, Ted Gurr argues, is 
a consequence of misachievements which are caused by a foreign agent. 
The relevance of achievements in tcrffis of goals and the value placed 
upon them may, in the case of extreme importance, cause the frustrated 
person to attack that agent as a source of his frustrations.4 A person, 
however, responds violently when he perceives that his whole existence 
is at stake. His potential response may be aimed at destroying the 
15 
source of threat if it should be the only way to stop potential har�. 
as h� perceives it, which will occur to him if he does not act. There-
fore, the frustration-aggression phenonenon may function according to 
the degree of induced anger of which causes and magnitude of r�sponse 
5 
are learned through the socialization process. 
The frustration-aggression theory was introduced in 1939 b7 
Dollard and Miller has generated various arguments, one of which says 
that " . .. a state of frustratio.n may lead to aggressive, regressive, or 
resigned behavior. 11 6 The author also argues that the in...:_viciual' s 
capacity for agression increases once he is in a group of the sa�e 
orientation. This is simply because the fear of punishment would be 
less, plus the fact that " ... within groups agression would be greater 
in an organized rather than an unorganized group, since punishment 
expectations would be more cl�arly defined in the former than in the 
latter, and would in any case be less since an organized group by 
definition is one within which the occurrence of hostility does not 
1 d d. . . 11 7 ea to isintegration. 
Discontent and dissatisfaction have a direct bearing on people's 
attitudes and orientations. Existence of discontent and dissatisfaction 
create the necessary impetus for a total change of the existing social 
and political orders as perceived by a certain population, eventhough 
slight actions may not take place to bring about the hoped-for changes. 
DJvies argues that when the chances of death are high, it is likely 
th<.lt people's feelings of discontent will remain dormant; but the 
lower the chances of death, the more likely it is that people will 
<lc�onstrate the degree of their dissatisfaction by an equivalent 
degree of resistance.
8 
Therefore, if the latter state exists and 
if their discontent is at a maxir.iu:':'l, : � may be that a revolution is 
underway. 
A society may be described as a reservoir in which the su� 
total of people's needs, desires, events and happenings are inter-. 
acting and undergoing constant changes. Therefore, " .. . the possibil-
ity of violent socio-political conflict," Arnold Feldr:1an assumes, "is 
always present in every society," and revolutions consist of extrer.w:s 
of tense situations between two opposing and interacting forces once 
tension-management fails to predominate.
9 
Thus, the breaking of 
tension-management is caused by a specific degree of social change 
from which strains that are caused by. the socio-political interactions 
10 
will erupt and transform into a potential revolution. 
Leonard Berkowitz, basically in agreement with the frustration­
aggression theory, 11 refers intergroup conflict to a set of variables 
charged, rightly or wrongly, with potential effects on people's behavior 
so that, as a result, people com.�it acts of aggression to hold up their 
b 1 • f 
12 C�l.e S .  Approaching h_is proposition through the experiences of the 
past European religious rivalries and their con sequences--killings for 
potential gains or avoiding predictable threats--Berkowitz contends 
that 11 • • •  ideological conflict frequently results from essentially simi-
lar conditions, that is, perceiving aggression as a means of gaining 
ends dictated by one's beliefs.1113 
It is a?parent from Berkowitz's discussion that the magnitude 
of alienation and opposition between groups ·y determine the likelihood 
of aggression anci conflict. 
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In the foregoing discuss ion, we tried to explore the s co?c of 
causes of violence and resis tance in general to 6ee where the Palestin-
ian R�s is tancc fits . Afcer a brief review of the l iterature o� the 
Palestine Resis�ance Movc�ent, we will 2??1Y these cont��?orary in�cr-
pretat ions o f  resis tance to the present case s tudy. 
Existing Literature on the Palestine Res is t ance Movement 
Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Palestine Res istance 
Movement had no mention in the literature o f  political s c ience . The 
violent incidents that took place before 1967 between the Fedaveen and 
the Israelis were reported in newspapers as Egyp t i an, Jordanian and 
Syrian infiltrators into Israel . 
It was not until a few months after the 1967 war that th? 
Fedayeen became recognized as an element in the Arab-Israeli dilemma, 
due to frequent attacks between the Fedayeen and the Is raelis. Con-
sequentl y ,  their movement and actions became an integral part o f  the 
daily news. 
Due to the Fedayeen ' s  mounting activitie&, the Pales tine 
Res i s tance became the focus o f  some s cholarly writings. The national-
istic orientations of the Palestine people is Will iam Quandt' s  focus 
of study. Quandt assumes that the present movement may be the highest 
s tage of Palestinian national ism. His s tudy " . . .  analyzes developments 
in organization, leadership, ideology, and s t rategy within the Fedayeen 
l'· movement . " ... 
When such movements exist and impose themselves as a factor 
which canr.ot be ignored , the attention and interests of writers vary 
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according to specific points and sides they want to discov�r. The 
dev�lopmcnts of the Palestine Resistance in a somewhat historical 
perspective is Pr ofessor M. Hudson's discussion. H8 deals �ith t�e 
Movement in tcrras of its role in the Middle East crisis, and its 
effectiveness on Israel, the Arab countries and the international 
community as well.15 
Another fact of the Palestine Resistance is discussed by 
E. A. Nakhleh. The author contends that the Palestinian Resistance 
docs not function according to a blueprint or long-range program 
16 
despite the clarity of their goal. However, Professor Nakhleh's 
analysis concerns itself with the violent process of the Movement 
with respect to the emergence and justification of violence, as the 
factions of the Movement see them, using the interpretations of 
17 Arendt, Fanon, Marx, and Waskow. 
The political socialization of the commandos is the theme 
of another article. The author uses attitude surveys conducted on 
Palestinian school children living in Jordan. The article reveals 
many interesting aspects about the political socialization of Pale-
18 
stinians in gen�ral and the potential commando-member in particular. 
The Palestine Liberation Organiza�ion Research Center pub-
lishcd many books and articles concerning the legal and historical 
aspects of the Palestine question which led to the present-day armed 
resistance. Som� major groups in the Movement published some booklets 
in <lcsctiptions of the resistance and the goals and orientations govern-
ing their activities, and the insti�·1tional framework of the future 
Palestine they advocate. 
There docs not seem to be other ma j o r  schol arly studies of  
tiic Pales tine Re:sistancc Movenent. 
So�c Rc�arks on t�e Litera ture 
An ana lysis o f  the views of  H. Xieburg, R .  Dahl, T. Gurr, 
A. Yates, J.  Davies, A. Feldman, and L. Berkowitz reveals two things: 
1. The i r  findings were a rrived a t  from specific political and 
social events and situa t ions. 
2 .  Because o f  specific incidents which evoke certain feelings 
within a person, the human individu a l  acts as he does . If the indivi­
dual is exposed to an act  which he perceives as constructive, in terms 
o f  his present or future physical and moral goals, his reaction may 
tend to be peaceful. If he is exposed to and directly influenced by 
an act  which he feels a s  infringing upon his s tate of  being, the way 
he understands it,  his reaction would be oriented towards putting an 
end to  that act.  Thus, his reaction is heightened by the action 
itself. Therefore, anger is but a sta ge o f  total preparedness from 
which any action could be performed .  Here arises an important question: 
Wha t, in reality, are the factors that lea d individuals, groups or 
societies to a stage of anger? The above-mentioned authors refer to 
this in broad terms s uch a s  emotions or learned behavior, simply because 
their experiments were conducted on animals such as rats, cats and the 
like; animals do not exhibit grounds for necessary specificity which is 
needed for D general and inclusive theory. 
For a t  least two reas ons , it is difficult to apply any one of  
th� interpretations o f  resistance discussed above to  the Palestine 
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Res is tance Movement: (1) This resistance is not taking place in one 
socio-political entity , rather in four pol itically-separa ted a�d 
emotionally-interconnected entities --the res i s tance move�ents in 
Jordan, Syria , Lebanon, and rs ·rael--aga inst one political entity-­
Isra el--and over one geographica l ly-defined en tity--Palestine.19 (2) 
The anger-s a turated "frus tration-aggress ion'' theory holds true for. 
s pontaneous individual and group violence, and also for unorganized 
col lcc tive viol ence. It was not shown tha·t control led , directed , 
and conditioned a c ts of  violence cha t  are formalized by organi za-
tional s tructures function according to the "frus tration - aggress ion" 
20 syndro�e. Therefore, a more inclus ive approach needs to be <level-
oped. How does this need to be done in regard to our topic since 
attitude surveys are nearly non-existent? 
Although a t titude surveys are nearly non-existent,  there are 
plenty of  individual cases tha t  manifest the a ttitudinal changes a �ong 
the Pales tinian people. Therefore, the bulk of the supportive materials 
for the behavioral and theoretical a pproach of  this thesis are these 
individua l cas es ;  and conclusions wil l be drawn taking this limitation 
into account. 
Although there are many publica tions and articles written by 
interes ted scholars and concerned organizations and ins t i tutions a bout 
the Palest inian Res i s tance , the economic , social , and pol itical life, 
o r  the Palestinian refugees, there is an ins ignificant effort to tie 
these conditions and their psychological repercuss ions to the Resistance 
Movement. Therefore, be si des the political aspects involved, this thesis 
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makes an effort to show the im�a ct o f  �hese socio-econo�ic circu�­
s tan ccs which brou3ht about an organized support and revival o f  the 
Resistance . 
Su :':':-::a :::-v 
To l i wit the s cope o f  our discussion, several propositions . 
were suggested in Chapter I as  a fra mework within which the Palestine 
Res is tance Movement is discuss ed. Chapter I includes a brief a ccount 
o f  the proble� which is considered the source o f  the creation o f  the 
Movement a s  well a s  a statement as  to how the research in this paper 
was conducted. 
In Chapter II, several views o f  some scholars were presented.  
These v ie w s  dealt with some po ssible causes o f  pol itical protest and 
resis tance, violence, and revolution, and their possible a ppl ication 
to the case of the Palestine Resistance Movement .  
Aspe cts of the Following Chapt�rs 
The development of events that led to the creation of the 
state of Israel , and why Palestinians view the state of Israel a s  
illegitimate , are some aspects o f  our discus sion in Chapter III . 
In Chapter IV, the ana lys is dea l s  with the circumstances and 
expectations of the Palestinians which strengthened their movement . 
By circums tances and expectations is meant: 
1. The economic depriva tions, political repress ion, so cial 
misa chiQvemcnts , dissatisfa ction and dis content; 
2. The �us t i f�cation and init ia t ion of violence, with the 
inte:rna tiona l co ;;i.rnunity and the Arab co untries having failed to 
provide a solution to the problem; and, 
3. Economic well-being,  political aspirations , and social 
achievements as eventual rewards . 
Cha?tcr IV, than, discovers the magnitude of iss ues which 
strengthened a�d gave new lights to previously exis ten t (but dorm�nt) 
resistance. 
Since 1967, aft�r the so-called Six-Day War, the resis tance 
was escalated in terms of  attacks and counterattacks. The esc alation 
included the international co1.1munity in regard to highjacking planes 
and government officials, and s imilar oper ations which created a tense 
local and international atmosphere. These activities resulted in (a) 
more apparent divisions among some groups in the Movement and Arab 
countries (according to the s ides they take) , and· (b) tense and possibly 
explosive s ituations in the are due to Israeli r eprisals and their 
repercussions. These developments are the focus of  Chapter V .  
In Chapter VI we will draw some conclus ions o n  our initial 
propos itions. Also, we will discuss the effects of  the Movement on 
the Middle East and s p eculate on wh at future developments may co�e 
about. 
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This is not to sug3est .:.:·.::: t  1 1 frustration-aggression" does 
not apply t:o s true tu red a:-.<.. i: .:..;�-. , ; v ::ganize:d res is t:ance mover.lenr:s. 
A t  r:hc same time, the in�erp::0��� �o�s of �he authors quote:� do not 
necessarily apply to any or3v;1ize<l resistance. What may be needed , 
then, is specific researc> . .::; ;-,<.. studies on resistance which is con­
s idered to be organized a·.1d functions under one commanding umbrella. 
CH.APTER III 
ORIGI?\S A:\ D DEVELOP�·12\TS OF TnE PALESTIXE RESISTA�CE 
There was no such thing as Pales tinians . . .  It was not 
as though there was a Palestinian ::>eo ple in Palestine 
cons idering itself as a Palestinian peo?le and w0 came 
and threw them out and took their country away from 
them . They did not exis t. 
Golda Meir, The Arab Worl d, Vo l.  III 
June 15 , 1969. 
If I were a young Ara b,  I might also be one of the 
Fcdayeen . 
Dav id Ben-Gurion, Chicago Tri�une, 
May 6 ,  1973. 
The tragedy of the people of Pa lestine is that their 
country was ' given' by a foreign power to another 
?eople for the creation of a new s ta te .  
Bertrand Rus s e l  
The Middle East Newsletter , Vol .  I V ,  
1970 
In the previous chapter a brief analysis of contemporary 
interpretat ions on violence and revoiut ions by some s cholars was pre-
sented. A brief survey o f  some o f  the existing litera ture on the 
Pa lestine Resistance Movement dealt  mainly with the nature of this 
literature ; that is , t he a pproach and scope within which the Pale-
s t inc Rcs i s tDncc was discus s e d .  
In this cha pte r ,  the discussion deals with our firs t propo-
s ition, whic11 s tates that though the conventional wisdom in the 
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l i terature on rcs itance a n d  violence suggests tha t i t  i s  s t ructural 
inequa l i ties and unrepresentative government �- : provokes a l ienated 
groups in society to view the government as i l l e g i � ima t c , in s ome 
cases it may be that a l ienated groups view the s ta t e  and the po: i c i ­
cal systems t�ems clves a s  illesiti�a t e . This was the c a s e  o f  the 
P a l e s tinians of Israel who s t a yed in I i r a e l  a f t e r  the 194 7 - 1948 wa r .  
This w a s  a l s o  the c a s e  o f  those P a l e s t inians o f  the West Bank o f  the 
Jordan River and of the Gaza S t r i p  whose lands became part o f  I s r a e l  
in 1967 , and those P a l e s t inians who a r e  l iving i n  exil e . I t  was the 
i n i t i a l  view of ·the Pales t inians that the new I s r a e li  government was 
i l l e g itimate because they saw the s ta te o f · rsrael a s  illegitima t e . 
This i l l e g i t imacy rendered the I s r a e l i  government unrepre senta t ive 
in the eyes o f  the Pales t inians . 
The rhetoric which surrounds the P a l e s t ine Resis tance , the 
P a l e s t inian p e op l e , and P a l e s t ine i t s e l f  varies greatly even among 
people o f  the same p o l i t i c o -philosophical orientat ions . Whatever 
varia tions o f  rhetoric exist to describ e ,  discus s , or even suppress 
the originality o f  the P a l e s t ine Resistance and whether o r  n o t  there 
exists a P a l e s t inian p e o p l e ,  there mus t  be some undisputed f a c t s  a s  
they p e r t a i n  to this que s tion . T o  uncover these f a c t s , we w i l l  take 
the reader a l i t t l e  back in t ime to s ta rt with the origins of the 
P a l e s t ine Res is�ance and � ring him up-to-date with the present 
developments . 
I t  seems a mere w a s te o f  t ime and energy to try to show that 
there a r c  P a l e s t inian people s imply because this fact speaks for i t s e l f  
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in many respects ; historica: ,  lega l ,  economic and policical  aspects . 
Consequently,  what rema ins o f  our concern in this chapter is the 
dcvclop�ent of the Pales tine Resistance . 
The Early For�s o f  Resistance 
As early as the l a s t  decade of the Nineteenth Ce���ry the 
Palestinian Arabs became aware o f  t�e deal ings of  the people o f  the 
Jewish faith with the Turkish Sultan--Abdul Hamee d - -as related to per-
mit �ing the Jewish im.�igration to Pales t ine . At this time , in 1891 , 
the leaders of  Jerusalem sent a tel egram to the Sultan protes ting the 
substance o f  the Jewish demands .
1 
A s  a result of this prote s t ,  che 
Sultan issued an order to s top 1 1  • • •  the Jews from entering into , and 
buying lands in Palestine ." This induced the British to interfere 
with Turkish officials , thus rendering ineffective the restrictions 
put on Jewish immigra tion to Pales tine by the Sultan ' s  order. 2 
This four-s ided relationship- -�ewish, Turkish, Arab and 
British- -continued for more than a dozen years from the t ime of che 
firs t official  Palestinian protest of 1891 . However ,  Hertzl (the key 
man o f  the Zionist Mnvement) failed to convince the Turkish Sultan to 
help establish the Jewish national home in Pales t ine . Neither did he 
succeed in convincing the Pales tinian Arab representa t ives in the 
Turkish Parl iament of the benefj.ts of Jewish immigra tion to the Pale-
3 
s t inian A rab po?ulation. On the contrary, as  far as  the Palestinian 
/\rDb!:i \.;ere conce:rncd , Hertzl ' s  plight , coupled with the Zionist Con-
vcncion of 1897 at Basl , Switzerland, came as an alarm to the 
Pales t inians to rally them against all maneuvering and cla ins towards 
the establishment o f  a Jewish national ho:ne in Pales t ine . 
A l though Hertzl ' s  �??roach with th� Sultan did not succee d ,  
the Jewish im:ni�ration t o  Pales tine , even though on a l imited scale 
throughout the period be cween 1390-191 5 ,  and the land-ownership by 
Jews succeeded especial l y a fter the death of  the Sultan in 1908 .4 
A s  a consequence, in 1908, the Palestinians , distressed over 
the increasing Zionist influence on the Turkish authorities , and con-
s c ious about the new developments , 1.·iaged popular demonstra c ions against 
the Zionist policies and intentions in Palestine . In 1910 , strikes 
and demons trations 1 1  • • •  started in the city of Nazareth" and spread a l l  
over Palestine . In both years the demonstrators a ttacked Jewish pro ­
perties especially in the northern part of  Palest ine .
5 
The resis tance was not restricted to popular demonstrations 
and destruction of properties . I t  was larger in s co p e ,  : 1:ch that as  a 
resul t ,  many publications and newspapers were newly establ ished to 
inform the Palestinians and the people of  the neighboring countries 
about the s ituation . The Arab representa tives to the Turkish Parlia -
ment a l s o  pressu�ed, for cwo years , fro� 1909-1911, the Premier and 
his Minister of Interior (who were accused of supporting the Zionist 
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Movement) to declare that they were agains t the Zionist Movemen t .  
Besides the �orms of  resistance discussed above, other me�ns 
appeared on the s ce�1e , such as the es ta b l  ishment of the Union Party 
and the initiation of many organizat ions , a l l  in effort to fight the 
Zionist Movement ! 
A l l  of t�c activities init i a t ed by t�c Palestinians did not 
seem to have �cipcd except for the fact that the bulk of  the peo?le 
became a wa re of  the Zionist Movement snd its intentions in Palestine. 
At the t ime of  World War I and its a fterma th , the Palestinian Arab 
resistance s e emed to have t aken two mJ jor orientations . 
The Decisive Ye ars : 1914-1948 
Two and a half decades from 1890· passed, yet the Pales tinic.;n 
protests to the Po rte against the Zionisc Movement ' s  a ctivities did 
not improve their s ituation. They were suspiriious o f  the Turkish 
leaders ' good will towards them a t  a time when 11 • • • in 1915 , Great 
Brita in promised to Sheikh Hussein o f  Mecca that in return for the 
help of  his Arab a rmies in the campaign against Turkey, Germany ' s  
ally in World War I ,  a l l  Palestine plus Iraq, Syria and Trans jordan 
and the Arabian Penninsula would b e  free and independent once cheir 
Turkish r1.1lers had been defeated . 1 18 Accordingly , in 1916, the Pa le­
s tin ian leaders, like a l l  the Ara b  leaders a t  the time, supported t�e 
efforts o f ,  and were satisf ied with, the contents upon which Scherif 
Hus s e in declared the Arab Revolution aga inst the Turkish presence in 
the area . 9 Ironically, the total Ara b support of  Hus s ein in his 
fighting the Ottomans for the independence o f  their country co incided 
with the Sykes-Picot agreement in which the British and the French 
<.i g "eed upon the division o f  the area after the Turkish defea t . 10 
(The Arabs at t�e �i�e did not know what this agreement was about 
until yea rs lat er) . 
') ,.. .JV 
In jo inin3 c�c War along t�e Allies s ide, che Arabs, �n gen�ral, 
foresaw t�at be ing , again,  masters o� their own des tinies was drawing 
neare r .  The Palestinians, in ?�rc icular, supported and advocated the 
Arab revolution not only becau.se of the fact that the Turkish de·f�a t 
would bri.-ig indc;;pcndence but a l s o  b'3cc.use indc�x·:-:dc:nc� would ev�0t-
ually put an end to their insecurity against the Zionist intentions . 
The following events, however, even w�en the Ara o  io���$ �ere s � � : :  
battling with the Turkish armies, proved to  the Arabs that the Al lies, 
and especially Britain, conspired against them by the Balfour Declara-
tion of 1917 , and, a fter the defeat of Turkey, by the Mandate sys tems 
which came as a fulfillme:it oz c:1c; Sykes -Picot a6ree:·: ...::· . ..: .  
To the Palestinians, l �ke � - :  n � 6 D S , the Balfour Declaration 
and the intentions of Britain and France of carrying out the Syke s -
Picot agreement constituted a ma j o r  breach and violation of the sub-
s tance of the British promise ( o f  helping the Arabs realize their 
independence after the Turkish defeat) . Accordingly the Christian-
Islamic organiza�ions in Palestine called for a general convention to 
dis cuss the developments .  Thus, early in 1919, delegates representing 
Ccich town, city, and region in Palestine met in,Jerusalem and ( 1) 11 • • • 
denounced the Balfour Declarat ion, the Jewish immigra tion, and the 
British Handate, 1 1  and .(2) demanded total independence o f  Palestine 
within the Arab union, the la tter being called "Greater Syria . " Among 
other resolutions, the Jerusalem Convention estoblished two delegations ; 
one t o  meet in June of the same year in Damascus and another to meet 
1 1  
w ith t11c A l l ies ' representat ives to the ;,.::-mistice talks . The Syrian 
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<l e: lcgat�s were: elected wherea s ·  the Palestinian and Lebanese d clegaces 
we:re chose:n by c�c private associac �ons , organizations , and the ��g 
families. ' '  . . .  The nu�b�: of i � lcgates to the Convention exceeded 
e: ighty anon� w'.:on :nore than twenty were from P a lestine: . 1 1 12 On the 
who le, the Convention u1�a:-.imously " . . . protesced agc:.inst A r t ic�e: 22 
of the Convenant of the Le ague o f  Nations" which recor..:aen<led placi::i.g 
"Syria" (Syria , Le banon an d ?alestine) under the Mandate systen. 13 
A l though the convencion protested strongly the subst ance of  Article 
2 2  o f  the Convenant o f  the League o f  N2tions, the delegates sought 
that the United States be the ass i s t ing power if Art icle 22 had to 
14 be carried out. 
The King-Crane report (the report of the American Commis s ion­
ers of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey) is a detailerl 
United States official documen� that describes the general feelings of  
the p eo ple of the area a t  the time . The Commi s s ion gathered its  infor-
mation through £requent visits to towns and �itie s ,  meeting with dele-
gates , representative s ,  and councils 0£ all creeds and orientations 
for a period of eleven days. 15 Their a s s ignment in Palestine covered 
eighteen major towns from a ll parts o f  Palestine .
16 
They met with a 
total of  140 delgations representing the various polit ical, social, 
economic , and religious groups in the country in which the inhabita�cs 
com.·nunicated their views to the Commiss ion 1 1 • • •  with a large .degree of 
fronkness with which opinions were expressed . . .  even where there w as 
e:vid�nt fcor of  conscqucncc s . 1 117 (See A ppendix I B) 
Besides t!1e Comnis s ion meeting with these delegations , and 
listening to t�cir de�ands concerning their hopes � f  the future o f  
their country , they a l s o  received 1 , 863 pet itions from the entire 
a reas of Pales tine , Syria and Lebanon as shown in the following 
table . 
TABLE 1 
The Concerns of the People of the Areas Expressed in Petit�ons 
and by Issues as Reported by the King-Crane Commiss ion1 
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I ssues 
No . of P e t i tions For 
(Tot� 1 1863) 
Percent 
of Pet itions 
For United Syria (Syria , 
Lebanon and Pa l e s t ine) 
For Separate Palestine 
For Absolute Independence o f  
Syria 
For Guarding ·the Rights . of 
Minorities 
For British Mandate 
For British "Ass is tance" 
For British "Assis tance" 
as Second Choice 
For American Mandate 
For American "Assis tance" 
For Complete Zionist P rogram 
(Jewish State and immigra ­
t ion) 
For Modified Zionist Program 
Against Zionist Program 
1500 80 .40 
6 . 32 
1370 7 J . 50 
1023 54 . 90 
66 3 . 5 3  
4 . 21 
1032 55 . 30 
57 3 . 0 5  
1064 57 .00 
11 . 5 9  
8 .40 
1350 7 2 . 30 
Th e ?rec�ding table clears up �any points : 
1 .  The great majority of  peticions , 80.40 percent, �ere for 
a Uni te:d SyriCJ ·.::1cn Palest ine was included in the union. This " 
. ff . . t <l d d l . . z .  . 1 1 19 in c cct , is in en c as a ec aration against ionism. 
2. T�e second largest majority, 7 3 . 50 p�rccnt , cx�r�ss�d 
1 1  • • • absolute inde�cndence , 1 1 w i th the United States or Britain or t? 
he the assisting power and not the raanda tory power. Xanda tory pm,;er 
had insignificant support . 
3 .  The third largest majority refused the Zionist program. 
Among the 1863 petitions , " . . .  1350 (72.30 percent) protested against 
Zionist claims and purposes , 1 1  which constituted 11 • • •  the third largest 
number for any one point and represents a more widespread general 
opinion among both Moslems and Christians than any other. The anti-
Zionist note was especially s t rong in Palestine , where 222 (85 . 30 
percent) o f  the 260 petitions declared against the Zionirt program . 
.. 
20 
This is the largest percentage in the dis trict for any one point. 1 1  
As opposed to th is,  
4.  A small percentage (.99 percent) o f  the total popula t ion 
was for a complete or modified Jewis� program, keeping in mind that 
a l l  the Jews in Palestine , 1 1  • • •  who constituted a l ittle over ten 
percent of the population , were all for Zionism.11 2.l 
Remarks on the Repo�t 
I f  one doubts the accuracy of these petitions in mathematica: 
tcr�s , the dou�t do�s not render these petitions unrepresenative of 
the: 6C:ne: ral fe:e: lings and orientations o f  the peopie at  r.he ti:-::c .  
" . . .  Ti1e: pC;::itions, 1 1 the King-C� .. _ Repor·t says, " a re certa inly 
rcprc:sentdt ive. A s  the classifie� l ist of delc2�t ions received 
by the Commission clearly ind icates, the petitions came from a 
wide range o f  political , economic, social, and rel i2ious classes 
and organizations. I t  was genera lly known throughout Syria that 
the American Cormnission \.JOuld receive in confidence any docum�nts 
that any individual or group should care to present .  In the few 
c ities in which the military authorities sought to exert control, 
directly or indirectly,  over the delegations, without exce?tion, 
the opposition parties found opportunities to present r.hc�r ideas 
to the Commission, if  not always orally,  a t  least in writ ing . 1 1 22 
3l, 
Another critic ism may be that the Report could have been 
true o f  the total A rab popula t ion in the area , but yet it does not 
necessarily mean that it could have been representat ive o f  the 
people who lived in Palestine, be cause the Report does not ca te­
gorize the area in terms o f  its three pa rts;  the Syrian, the Leban­
e se ,  and the Palestinian parts.  The reader s�ould not fall in such 
a t ra p ,  because the Report did not classify issues by the parts o f  
"Syria , "  for the following reasons: 
First , the Co�mission' s work wa s in an area called Syria, 
with Lebanon and Pa lestine parts of it . S i�ce 80.40 percent of :he 
petit ions were for United Syria , and 7 3 . 50 percent were for absolute 
independence , and since the petit ions were repre senative of the total 
population (sec ft . 22) , then the ge�c��: will of the people of the 
area was expresse d . 
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Second , the inhabitants of the southern part of Syria (Pale­
s t ine) would be directly affected by the establ ishment of a Jewish 
national home in Palest ine . Because of fear of the rea l ization of 
such an idea , they could have ardently supported, more than any other 
factions- -the Syrians and the Lebanese--an absolute independence in 
United Syria , as they showed s t rong opposition to the Zionist program 
(see ft . 20) , for the mere fact that absolute independence would elim­
inate their fears of Zionism and render its intentions unreal ize�. 
Therefore, if the Report should be considered in terms of the degree 
of representation to the Palestinians , a t t itudes and desires , it 
should be considered under - representative . . 
The wishes and desires of the people of the area did not seem 
to have swayed the opinions of the Allies , and the demands of the 
delegates had no impact on them except in taking further steps towards 
their a ims and more restrictions on the movement s  of the Arab leaders . 
One of these measures was the withdrawal of the British forces from 
Syria and Lebanon to Palest ine leaving the French armies in charge . 
This a c t  by itself steered the events in the area towards new develop­
ments , even though they const i tuted expansions of the previous one s ,  
but this time these developments were confined in influence to the 
specific area and its mandatory power . That is , (1) the respons ibility 
of each mandatory power became specific and (2) the activities of the 
people became restricted, repressed and punished by each mandatory 
power a ccording to its area of jurisdiction. 
The following years did not w itneps activities other than 
demonstrations and protests by the Pa l e s t inians hoping that the British 
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rc�ssuranccs of no c al lo�ing a Zionist: s tace in ?alestine , would co�c 
true . However , t�e creation of  the .Jewish Agency, and the incr0asing 
Jewish i::-J.1igration (see Appendix II) increased t:,0 Palest inia':"ls ' s u s -
picion of  the Eritis� authorities and administrotion in ?ales ti�� and 
their collabora t ion with the Zionist Q;ga�ization and see�cd to have 
pushed the Palestinians to an extreme . 23  As a resul t ,  the ?Cried ;ro� 
1 9 2 9  until 1948 was characterize� by constant upheaval s ,  in wiich two 
ma j o r  �ates emerged as  periods when a i l -encompa s s ing violent processes 
took place . T�e first was in 1929 and the second from 1936 to 1 9 39 . 
The events that t1Jok place in the years mentioned above were o f  suo-
stantial effectiveness because they were the sum total oi all  previous 
means of protest (which were e�ecuted individually over a period o f  
forty years) used s imultaneously, paralyzing the British administration 
in Pales tine for a t ime . Al though the 1929 events did not l � s t  more 
than fifteen days , many people on both sides - -Palest inians and Jews --
were kille d ,  and the British government had to issue the so -called 
W1 . p f 1930 1 . . . 24 u.te apers o . to ca m tne s it:ua t:ion.  The if.'ii te Papers , how-
ever, were respons ive to the Palestinians ' demands to the extent t�at 
in 1931 " . . .  as sequel to the Passfield White Paper (1 930) , the Seven-
teenth Zionist Congress passes (d) vote of no confidence , s ignifying 
that Weizmann no longer acceptable as Pres ident . 1 1 25 However ,  the 
Zionist influence on the British govern�ent suppressed the promises 
of the White Papers and consequently the preconditions of 1929, as  
far as  the Palestinians were concerned, continued on a rather larger 
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scale . It became evid .... . · .:  to the Palestinians , at ->ie t ime , that 
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the B r i t ish ;;; d;-:-,fnistra t ion ::1eant i l l -t-i ill to t!1e P a l e s t inians . fa. ccord -
ingly, the 1 9 3 6 - 1 9 3 9  revolution demons trated their feel ings o f  despa ir 
and hop�lcssncss to th8 Mandatory governnent hoping i t  would res?ond 
to their demands . Thus , the P a l e s t inians waged their campa ign on the 
B r i t i s h  <Jdmin i s t r a t ion in P a l e s t ine , a s  well a s  the J;::wish s e t t l ers 
for three years in which the B r i t is�1 armies killed most of t:..e Xove-
mcnt ' s  leaders and dispersed the others . Again,  the British govern-
ment issued the White Papers o f  1939 tha t did not rr.ean much to the 
Pales t inians s ince it contained essentially what other papers recom-
mended and meanwhile the Zionist protest appeared to be s tronger than 
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ever . Consequently, this revolution failed to provide the P a les t in-
ians with any improvement and th is further affected the outcome o f  
events i n  the following years to the benefi� o f  the Zioni s t s . 
An Analys is o f  the Events Between 1890-1 9 3 9  
I t  s e ems , s o  f a r ,  from the above d�scussion, a s  though the 
P;1 les tinian Arabs were a tta eking the ;nandatory power ,  the Zionist 
s e tt l ers , 3nd the Jewish properties because of their (the Pales t in -
ians) initial perception and f e a r  of the Z ionist intentions i n  
Pales tine ; and i t  s eems that the Zionists were only defend ing them-
selves . This is not tru e .  The Jewish Agency in Palestine was func-
t i oning with clear objectives ; with organiza t iona l ,  p o l i t ical and 
financial goals to a tt a in us ing all possible means. 28 Since the 
A�cncy corn?ris�<l g=oups o f  different political orientations and 
ou t :.0·: · .; , ar,d s ince it (the A gency) was the o fficia l  common denoiTlin-
a tor of a l l  the Zionist groups , the militant organiza t ions such as 
t�c I r3un ,  Stern Gang, an� the Haganah we=e functioning withi� t�e 
fra�C\·1or\<. a l ready progra:::-,:;;ed by the Zionist: Congre s s e s . The:re:ore , 
the Agency, being the head organ , constituted one organization of 
different hranc�es (including militants) working f o r  the sa�e goal 
on enc hanci , and on the oche r ,  encouraging all means that could �ring 
about the fulf illment o f that goa l .  ��e militant groups such as c�ose 
�cntioncd were prerequisites for program-execution . A pr0� - � a -execu-
t�on, in such a time of uncertainties and upheava ls , does not come 
about by defense a lone , buc also by org·anized offensive . This is hoN 
the nilitant groups within the .politic.al organ o f  the Agency did their 
duties . T�ey were a ttacking Palestinians and British soldiers whenever 
it was pos s ible . 2 9 
However, the repeated organized actions o f . these forces made 
clear to the Palestinians the role they were playing and that they 
intended to carry out,  which parpetuated their fear and sense o f  
insecurity . 
The Zionists had total organizationa l ,  financial and p o l i t i c a l  
support o f  t!1e World Zion:...s t Organization and moral and administrative 
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support from the British government . The Palest inians had none of 
tha t .  Divided among themselves , they t.Jere battling many social and 
economic proole�s Defore and during their battles with the Zionist 
forces and the }1andatory powe r .  What wen� these probl ems and how did 
they a f fect the Palestinian resistance? 
2ro�i�e�t �aces About t�e ?re-1 948 Pa l e s t i�ian Socie:y 
1 .  T�e four centuries o f  Turkis� _ ccup2tion o �  the �idcilc 
Ea s t  produced a�ong ocher things , two d i s t inct c l a s s e s ; a very �ew 
lanu�<l-aristocracy , and a mass of impoverished people . ?he landed-
a risticracy was not only wealthy but also prestigious among both the 
Turkish authorities and the mass o f  the P a l e s t inian people . This 
was due to ti1e fact tha t ,  b. order to l ive , the majority of che 
p�oplc had to work on the land o f  this elite s ince working the land 
was the nain source o f  l iving a t  the t i�e . Thus , he who controlled 
the people ' s  bread-�inning, controlled their lives . Consequently, 
peopl e ' s  · a llegiance to them became a necess ity . 
2 .  The social s t ructure o f  P a l e s t ine a t  the t ime was semi-
tribal and a dhered to traditio�al social and rel igious teachings and 
upbringing through which this a r i s tQcracy (mentioned above) came , l e d ,  
and w a s  divided within itsel f .  The division o f  this aris tocracy was 
ameliorated by fa"1il ies ' rivalries along which most o f  the early P a l e -
s t inian protests (against the Turkish occupat ion , the Zionist Movement ,  
31 and the British �andate) developed and took place . 
3 .  The social s t ructure , however , was noc the only peculiar 
problem. There was a l s o  the persistence of tradit�onal fra gmented 
leadership which crippled the resis tance and dominated Palestinian 
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society . 
4 .  The subsistence level of livin6 and the lack of 1 1know-tl0w11 
with which t:1c Palestinians were saddled left the e: a ::-ly existence with 
no c f f c c t iv� services . Ii e-.. .. oi'Oiic weal th is based on "know -'!-ww" ( i f  
the resourc�s exisc) , and i£ a cquiring t�e skills requires ecu c a t i o � ,  
chcn there was n o  hop� t h a t  the Pales t inians could cha�ge t�cir e c o -
nomic p o s i tion . By 1937 , 18 years a f� e r  the beginning o r  the Ma�da tc , 
only 15 percent o f  ��0 people were l icera t e . 33 
Another f a c t o r ,  which we should a ccount f o r  with respect to 
the traditional P a l e s tinian socie�y, by and l a rge , w a s  their conce2-
tion of res istance , which stressed a rel ig�ous overtone for tne 
fol lowing reasor.s·: 
1 .  The only l e a rned and w e l l - l i s tened to groups in traditional 
Islam ·were the Ul ema and Sheikhs . With the presence of the manda tory 
power and its influence on the P a l e s t inian society,  coupled with the 
rise o f  n a t ionalism, the Ulema was the only vocal group that pers isced 
and �.;hich h a d  the means to communi c a t e  its bel'iefs and messages to the 
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peopl e . 
2 .  Their messages and speeches stressed the p o s i t ion o f  the 
A rab society a g a inst that of the West and the unacceptable changes 
which the West 1 s  civilization would make in theirs . Consequently, a 
simple call for jihad was conveyed . Jihad by i t s e l f  does not represent 
organized movement and does not render a resis tance succe s s ful , s imply 
because the times demanded more than tha t ;  that is , discipl ine , money , 
tra incd men and the 1 ike . 35 One exar.1ple o f  such a religious tone o f  
res istance was that o f  the leader o f  the 1 93 6 - 1 9 3 9  revolution . A t  
the t ime o f  the crack-down upon him and his men by the British army, 
1 1  • • • the 65 -ycar o l d  )foslim prea che r , "  Izz a l -Din a l -Q a s s a m ,  had t:--.e 
Oi)portunity to es ca>- but refused to do s o ,  "preferring to d i e  a 
:�1ar:.:y r , 1 1  instead o f ,  as  the unders tanding o f  a r::ie<l rc::s istance:: �ay 
sug�cs t , . d . . . 36 esc.: .'i.ng an pcrpetu.: .:i.ng tne -:-es is tan cc. 
The 1936 - 1 939 Palest inian 1 1 revolu:ion , 11 havin3 in it:s bac�<-
ground a ll the religious , socia l ,  econo�ic and pol iLica l ?robie�s , 
could be idc::ntif ied and ciesc�i�cd only a s  spontar.�ous disorga�ized 
respdnses to the continuing or perpetua ting states o f  frustration 
which the Pales t inians , fathers and sons , had been having for 
. 37 generations . 
The uncercainties o f  the Second War, and che agonies created 
for both parties (discrimination against the Jews in Europe and dire 
nc::eds of the Palestinians) kept the fig�ting bet ween the cwo a t  an 
insignificant level . However , pefore the War was ove r ,  in 1944, 
the large-scale confrontat ions between the two factions resumed but , 
this time, with great disproportions. Why? 
1. As a consequence o f  ciiscri=ina tion against the Jews in 
Europe, beginning in 1 933 , the flow o f  immigrants was cons tan t ,  and 
many joined the m�litant organizations whi l e  they were in Europe. 38 
2 .  A Jewish quasi-government \·Jas created oy the 1 1  a drninis tra -
tivc ma ch inery" of the Zionists (the J ewish Agency) . This adrninistra-
tive r.1achinery gave total autonomy to the J ews and their daily life 
and also es tabl ished the Jewish army in 1941 to fight on the A ll ies 1 
') 9 s ide, and the Jewish Guard for internal s ecurity. � 
3.  The increase of wealt:·, o f  the Jewish community came from 
contribut ions fron abroo d ,  noney investQents in f ixed assets in Pale-
s tine , and the selli�g o f  40 percent of their indus tria l product ion 
l \ 1 , . 1 - • • 1 . d h 40 t o  t 1c ·""' � · :.c s rorces sta t i.oncc. :..:: :a es t ine an t e area. 
4 .  T�c i��LJct of. World War I: on the Jews increased t�2ir 
�crccption of incie?cndc�ce in a count=y where they COti-� be �asters . 
The different orgzniza t io�s , which had by then great potentia l ,  did 
not stop attac�ing the Pales tinians , d e s troying o f f i c i a l  (Eritis�) 
buildings and ?roperties, and comnitting other acts of  violence and 
t . 41 errori.sm. 
Unlike the Zionis t s , the Palestinians d�d not display improved 
methods a f ter t�e Second World War against the British forces and c�e 
Zionist Xovemcnt in Pales tine . Disorganization and lack o f  money and 
outs idQ support continued to ha�per their �£forts during the pos t -
World War I I  period . The consequences for the Palestinians were their 
expulsion from Pa lestine , thousands killed, tortured, and a total loss 
of  Palestine for which they fought fifty years not to los e .  
Conclusions 
Between the Palestinians and the Zionist Jews , there developed, 
through a period o f  about s ixty years, a culture of a l ienation, charac-
tcrized by protes ts , strikes , demonstrat ions , violence and kill ings . 
Ti1ese were based on their unde rstanding of  ec.ch other, the impact of  
discrimination of the Jews in Europe, and the rivalries and interests 
of tiw big powers . The Pal e s t inians , suspicious of Zionism, afraid 
o f  cultural dis integration if  the Zionist Movement was to succeed, 
increased their O>).Jsition to the Zionis'.: programs in Palestine, 
rc(used the ����ate c�vcn though the Lebow� of Nat ions im?OSed it on 
them) . Wit:1 ea c:: c:q:ierience the Palestinians went through , th.:::y ;net 
wi(\t frustration and sup?ress ion, adding to their percept ion of the 
Zionist danger �ore negative i�press ions . 
L ', , J  
7he: Je:�·JS w:-i.o fought t":-:e :?alesti!1ian s ,  also hcvi:1g ;::h..;; ir O'.-::-. 
�a s c  e:xpe:rie:nce:s, used their ?Otential to be sure that what ha??e�ed 
to tile:m in Euro?e would never happen aga in . Thus , they carried out 
acts  alon� che: ocher extr� - ·  In ott�r �ords , cwo factions were ou� 
to e:xte:r�ina tc e:ac� othe r .  The oucco�e coule never be forgoc:en . 
Eventually,  Zionism won the war . Most o f  the Pales t inians fled, s �  
that the:y did not have t o  face :he fate o f  others who were killed . 
So�1c were expelled, and a few rema i;.,.::d l iving where they had pre -
viously . However, the greater ? a r t ,  the majority, are not l iving 
whc::re: now th2 people whom they fou_:;ht with for decades l ive and 
do:nina te . The years o f  f ight:'..ng only spl _ _  them farther apart;  and 
with such a heritage of violence the majority o f  Palestinians thought 
that the govern:nent then in power was a perpetuation of the colo!1ial 
orde r .  �1os t of t:1e governors and the majority of the governed were 
a l iens co Palestine, were born in foreign countries, and occupied t:�e 
country by violence a t  the expense o f  the indigenous population whose 
ma j o rity then l ived in exil e .  Consequently , the government and state 
were neither representative o f  the indigenous people nor legitima c2,  
s ince they (Pa les t inians o f  Israel) still  considered themselves a ;art 
of the greater Palestinian population (whose majority lives outside 
Israel) and not of Israel . 
�n other words, to a non-pzrticipanc impartial party, who is  
ad�quotely informed and aware o f  the problerns at  the time, che s t a te 
of  Israel t'.�cn ca:.1e to exist not through a plebiscite and peaceful 
tra:;sf�r o f  !)Owers, but rather- as a crowning to a ?Cried of violence 
�nd bloodshed betwec::;:i Palestinizns and Jews . Cc:-. ::;cque�tly, it iva s  the 
fir�al Ot.<tcone of  diverse violent process es . 
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To the P a l e s t inians , Israel establ ished itself  not only 
aciain�t t:1e:ir >:-;ill , out also as a co7'.seqaence o: Bricish <lE::ce:.t a::1c! 
collaboration with Zionis� :.n many ways . A ccordingly , any scEte tha t  
is not a Palestinizn s :a:e in Pales t :.�e, and any govern�ent w�ich is 
not by and for c�e ? � l e: s c inians is E� ien and colonial in structur� 
and , therefore: , is neither legiti:na te nor representative . 
To  the Zionist Jews , Israel was establ ished as  a co�sc��ence 
o f  l ibera t ing che pronised homeland fron its occupiers , or set�ling 
of a people witho�t land in a land w:.:hout peopl e ,  where ;�ws would 
l ive in a country o f  their own, where they could no longer be discrirn­
ina tC:\.. aga ins t .  Consequently, a 11 Jews o f  the world are wel co�ed ir. 
Israel to l ive: in peace . Was chis possible i::1 the face o i  realities 
created by the: establ ishment of  the state of Israel? 
One of these indispucable reaL.ties which came about upon the 
e s tablishment o f  the state of Israel was the fate: of  the Pales tinian 
people .  T�eir fate was charact�rized by the following: 
1 .  The 11:a jority o:: them sought refuge in neigl1boring countries 
to save cheir lives . 
2 .  A s�all percentage of the� remained in Israel . 
3 .  Thousands o f  them died in the battles , massa cres , and 
tortures . 
4 .  A l l  o f  them engaged in one form or another o f  activities 
against the initiat ion of the Jewis� National Home in Pales t ine . 
5 . .\':.� of  t:h.:� were a f fected by the events preceding the 
cstabl is;1;:1cr.t of  the s:.:;::e o f  Israei ; t:1ey still hod fresh memories 
a :,o�..: t'.:� ir f :.gh t ing-�a r:es , fr:..ends , a::1d relatives who lost their 
l ives , and a l s o  ti� ko ss of their count:y . 
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41 On nany occas ions , Hureuitz , in his book �cntioned above, 
describes t�c � c t �vitics o f  the militant Jewish organizations and 
the c f f c c civc roles th�y played in t��ir s t ruggle for ? a l c s � inc . 
CHAPTER IV 
THE :>O!..I'::LC.!.L , SOC:!:?.L , riXD EC0:\0;.11c !"ACTORS 
AFFEC'l'I:\G ':HE PALESTI�E !"<l:SIST.�.:\CE 
I�aginc yourself to be a Palest inian Arab . Iraagi�e 
yourself to b e  on� of those rn�1 l �on Ar��s whose fathers 
and forefat�crs since t ime i��� .. � r � a l  had lived in Palc­
.:; t ine and cal led tha t land their home. I.:12 gine yourself 
l iving an<l p lanning and looking into the future with that 
sense of sccuricy and responsib ility which is nor�al and 
healthy in h�3an beings . . .  And then imagine yourself sud ­
d enly bei�g tossed around i� a wh irl winl of pol it i cal 
tu:-::'.oil t·::1 icn is neitner o r  your cho i ce nor of  yo1,.;r doing. 
Inaginc yourself b eco�ing overnigh t ,  homeless, penniless, 
with no L£rchly a s s e t  hut the clothes you have on . . .  
Ina gine yourself therefore in a situation where the most 
joyful hope you dare cherish i s  the hope that your loved 
ones may j o in you in the misery of hung e r ,  of cold, of  
dreary idleness , of ho�elessness, and of  hate.  
Fayez A .  Sayegh 
T�e Arab-Israeli Conf: �ct , 1956 
In this chapter, the discuss ion explores the Palestine 
�c sistance Nove:�1ent t:1at aro se directly after the es tabl i sh4:1ent of 
the State of I�rael and h a s  cont inued to endure unt i l  the present ti�e. 
T:1 is period will be exanined in the l i ght of our proposit ion that if a 
political syste� c�nds to restrain certain groups from a cquiring equa l 
right::; and st ...  ::·..1 s ,  and keep s other groups from participa ting in , or 
left outside the system, the impact of  such an arrange�ent is tens io� 
resulting :'.:::o:·.1 c: 1;,::cakdo�·�n of  cO!Tu-:lunicatic:-. b etw�en the existing govern-
. _,,.,_ ...:.lcc i s  l ikely to o ;::cur . The Pc:l.:s t inian Ar::.�_, (:i il lingly or um-.i i l l -
� <l  <·.=:1.:: :-.��r b <.:  .;;0d o� reason, logic, or emotions) have diassoc i� �...: '-
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themselves from the Israeli political system. Their attitudes toward 
those whom they consider the sources of their problems have become 
a ttitudes o f  hate , reveng e ,  and violenc e .  Howeve r ,  revenge and vio­
lence may flare up at any moment since all other channels o f  corrununi­
c a t ions are closed, and a l s o  beca�se Palestinians were not a s s imilated 
into the societies of their countries of refuge . 
The Palestinian tragedy of 1948 was actually initiated in 1917 
by the Balfour Declaration, was ratified by the League o f  Nations 
because it placed the Turkish heritage under the manda te system, and 
was executed in 1948 as a result of "growing pressures , both Zionist 
and interna tiona l , to create a Jewish state in Palestine . 111 
The S tate of Israel was established, among other things , to 
put an end to the sufferings o f  the Jews a l l  over the world, and to 
form the beginning o f  an era in which the Palestinian people have com­
pensated and are still compensating for the Jewish sufferings in Europe 
and elsewhere . This compensation was in live s ,  property , and prestige, 
and now it is in persistent economic deprivation, only because they 
happened to be Palestinians . The owners of the land living in their 
own homes where their fathers and forefathers grew up for twelve suc­
cess ive centuries ,  became dispersed, l iving in tents donated to them 
by welfare agencies and organizations . The once Pa l es t inian society 
became Palestinian corrununities living in refugee camps where their 
mis fortunes happened to take them. A l l  was a result of confronting 
Zionism and its forces with a divided leadership , incompa tible help 
and pressure given by the Arab countries, and basic social and economic 
5'j 
probL.:'.':'lS t1:<:: t aC.:C.:e:<l only confus ion i:-, -cheir ranks . Did t;1e s i t: u es t io-:-, 
change: a � ccr the creat ion of  the w t:ate of  I s rael , and how? 
T!iE J:'R.':C�<:.::�:D SOC�ETY: I t s  Pol:.r:ical �. s1')ects i9�S -
Tne: P a l e s t �nia� A rabs in Israel (!he I s ra e l i  A rabs) 
Since :948 , the A rabs who re��ined i n  Israel have been l iving 
under s trict �il i t a ry rcgul a !: :.o�s . 2  T�ese regula tions are: s t r i c t l y  
e:zccuted by specia l military courts where hundreds o f  Ara�s � a v e  been 
in ja il s ,  exile�, or sentenced beca�se :he Israeii �i:i:ary a�t�orities 
3 
have sus pected cheir activities . Any suspicious Arab l :.v ing in areas 
subj ec t: to mil i t a ry rule (240 , 000 persons prior t o  the June war of 
1967) would be tried in nili ta ry courts where he ���:d �ot be allowed 
to appeal . Also , there a�e many regions that an Arab cannot enter 
w ithout being arres ted . 4  
These restrictions that are presently i�?osed on the Arab 
populat ion l ivi�g in Israel �ere the main regula t ions imposed on the 
whole popul a tion of Pa les t ine in the mid-1940 ' s  by the British adrain i -
s t:r".:.l tion . However , in 1946 , the "Hebrew lawyers in the land o f  Israe:" 
protested s t rongly �gainst �hese regu l a t ions and called for theJ.r eli�-
inot ion because they violated the individual ' s  b a s i c  human rights . 5  
Sue� regul a t ions , however, do not �xist excep c in s t a te s  o f  
cm�rgcncy, (even plenty of  contemporary examples teach us w ithout 
reference to � ?��t�cular incident) , and if the <levelop�ents in the 
country <lo �oc ne cess ita te restrictions as such , and if the state 
autho r i t ies ?C rs is t in kee?ing these regu: a t ions in s p e c i f i c  a reas , 
.) .:. 
it is b�cause o �  uistrus� o f  the rcs i�e�ts of these areas and the 
f a c t  that libcralizacion o i  ?o:icies �ay encou�age acts that a f fect 
Isr�cl ' s  security. Thus > s ince these reg� l a t ions are directed against 
the ArDbs in I s �acl and im?osed on areas where the Arab po?ulation i s  
hcovily concentra t e d ,  their persistence is to keep the A r a b  population 
from taking any actions . This by itself constitu=cs a recognit ion� 
on the p a r t  o f  �he Israe�i 0ovcrn�ent , cha t · che A �abs o :  :srael do 
not share che principles and philoso?hies of the S t a t e  o� I�=ael with 
the rest of the ?Opulation, an� th�se re?r0ss ive �easures co�e as 
requirements to retain ?eace in the co�ncry . 
Howev e r >  re?ress ive measures prevent those people who �o not 
espouse the principles o:: the govern::-.ent from making aggress ive u.oves 
against the syste� because 11 • • •  as a rul e >  a successfu: populat ion �ay 
be expected to adopt behaviors des igned to maximize i t s  survival pocen-
tial an� to minimize the risk of loss e s >  wi�h respect to its particular 
ecological niche . 11 6 Hence, if the P a l e s t inian Araos should take any 
a c tion which is considered by the military authorities co be disrupt ive 
in the s t a t e ' s  security, they would suffer the consequence s .  These 
conse quences , howev� r ,  are of severe inp a c t  on them because their 
living conditions rnake them a d i s t inct community susceptible and very 
7 much vune :-ablc to the harshest Isra e l i  a t ta ck .  The imp a c t  0 £  any 
confront:.ition 'between the cwo is a zero-sum gar.le in which the Palestin-
i<:in Arab coo'.m�ait:y wou::.d be a sure loser . In this kind o f  s ituation, 
the P .:i l e s :.: � � iA!l.S Glrca<ly :iave los t ::-.any l iberties including their b a s i c  
rishts ( s e c  '° .... J.. L • 6) , and do �ot have a�yc�ing left to lose except their 
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lives . This alternative does not serve their purpose ;  and, a s  a 
response to their survival ins t in c t ,  they have condit ioned themselves 
to their realities in order to be able to adapt to the s ituation. 
Adaptation occurs whenever conditions above one ' s  capabilities 
exis t ;  but it is by no means certain that given a s ituation within 
their capab ilities , men w i l l  exercise their opportunity for choice 
in an adaptive manne r . 8 Thus the Palestinians in Israel can under no 
circums tances choose the kind o f  l ife they want to l ive ; they have to 
observe the Israeli laws for their personal s a fety . and adapt 'to these 
laws , choosing less dangerous means to express their state of mind . 
A l though sets o f  rules and regulations may be used against 
people to restrict their physical activities and actions , the human 
imaginat ion is too active, creative, and beyond any control by worldly 
authorities . In the history o f  occupation and repressive regimes where 
p1..!<>pl.t! 1 t1 1 1 c t: lv'it Lt!!J n i:c r.<!Hl.rJ .cl:t�d Lo 1:1ul>HiHttmco , tile ho1w<l - t o r  11 1..· L lorrn 
by the occupied people were expressed by diverse pass ive means . 
French resis tance during World War II was best expressed by 
l iterature; and if there is any means to show the present intellectuals ' 
dis content with the rigid policies of the Soviet Union, it would be 
best shown by the l iterary writings appearing every now and the n .  Thus , 
the Palestinians ' resistance , the kind o f  l ffe and the aspirat ions of 
the Arab res idents of the State of Israel , are expressed in many l iter­
ary forms among which poetry ranks firs t . 9 As l a t e  a s  April , 1 9 7 3 ,  two 
editors o f  "Al -Faj r , "  a n  Arab weekly, were arrested because o f  the 
latest of a series of articles sympathetic to the Resistance Movement . 
This � � � icl(; was d� s cribcci as the s :ron;(:s · = � � =  �ad a ? .  �arc<l in a 
n<.;wspap�r since 1S67 , a s  �t was concerned w�:� the kil l ings o f  
P <l l c.; s t inian l <.; adcrs ; K.:i�.1al 'N a s s e r ,  Yusse f :\ ...: � j a r ,  and .�<:i:nal Acwa n ,  
in Ik iru t ,  a t  i:�1i:: he:n<ls o f  I s ra e l i  cor:-.:na:ldos . 10 
:h� P £ l e s t inia:ls o �  I sra c: A f ter 1967 
- 'J J .J  
The 1567 wa r b etween Israel , Egypt ,  Syria , and Jordan had a 
gr<.;at b:p a c t  on t:1e P a l e s t inians : 
1 . The whole territory o f  Palestine came under ��raeli occu-
p a t ion , with about one -third of the init ial Pale s tinian popula t ion 
living the re . 
2 .  An exodus o f  P a l e s t ini.:. . .  s took place from the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip to Jordan. Under severe natura l condit ions , 
terrorized by t�e Israel i mil itary , new refugees (about 140 , 00 0  persons 
o[ Wesc Bank alone) walked the long ro2<l to estrangemen t .
1 1  
Few o f  
them, however, returned . Only f i fteen thousand returnees were ad�it ted 
to go back a fter incessent nediation oy the Red Cross ·:cpresentat ivcs . 
A l s o ,  r.1any of t:1ose who ·sought refuge in 1948 in the West Bank, s ought 
refuge in Jordan in 1 9 6 7 . 1 2 
As a conses�ence to the Israeli occupation o f  these territories , 
the ?Opular noocl <:!rupt ed in many towns and c i t it:s . These eruptions 
cook t:hc fo rms of sporadic shooting a t  units or individuc: _ .::; o f  the 
Isrocli a rmy , demonstTations , and shop -strike s . The Israeli r etal i a -
tions we re scv0rc ; �3ny hones were blown-up , shops were scaled with 
�0<l ta ?cs , :-:-:;:.:�,- )co:�:c were d.a ?ortec: anc were tra;-.s ferre d ,  and whole 
towns w0r� �0�olishc�: 
11 • • •  :Ln ;.S67 , ICL(C ' (��=erna�ional Co:r:ni ss ion o f  t:he: R ,._ ,: c-·o- - )  1 \,.\,;\oJ. l. ..::> .:> 
dc:lcgate:s observed > � fccr the even t ,  that che fol lowing vil lages and 
c.:.:-;-,i> s :ui<l be;cn <lc: s t roy.::c : Yal ou ,  Beit Xu�.a a:1d Yuw.:is ,  in c:,c Latrous 
<.t :C:o ; Sur i £ ,  Bcit: A\;\,a , 3eit �-:irs e::1 ar.d il s;lUyou th in the Hebron 
o r.::o ; and J i f l i � ,  Agarich and Xuscirat in the Jordan Va l l ay . They 
n l s o  sat-J that ce:r::ain quarters of Jerusalem and Qa l quilya had been . 
1 3  
de::-no l ishe:d . r·n Gaza a l o:1e in a two -�.c .:.:..1 pe riod , a total o f  2 , 5 54 
famil ies , co�?rising 1 5 , 8 5 5  persons , were a f fected by the de::1o l it ions 
carried out in July and Augus t ,  1971 in three refugee camps by the 
, 
Israeli authorities . �� 
In this kind of situat:ion, what a ?a l e s t inian can co is very 
l imited because the individua l ,  if a c t ive , is placed in j a i l  and in 
con� incment . The group h a s  shrunk to a n  individual ' s  s t a tu s  s ince i t  
is cut from other 3roups , and there:=ore, 8 s ingl e P a l e s t inian cor::.--:-,unity 
docs not exist in I s rae l , nor the conditions to make one . The sense 
o f  insecur ity a�on� Pa le st inians is �igh . Insecurity a�ong the group 
tends to dininis� i t s  resistance ( s e e  Cha pter II , ft . 7) . Therefore 
n group-co:n;nunity resistance does not exist because thcir p revious 
cxpericnc�s w�th the regime and t�e fear of consequences have been 
put ting the co:rcr.un ity to d i s integra tion . 
A 1 tno";Jg:-i sporad ic individual vio��ncc and p9pular demons tra·-
tions by t�e resicients o f  these regic�s aga ins t the I s r a e l i  unit:s 
occurre d ,  how do we account for l irniteci upheavals among the people o f  
the \./-.; s t  ���::·,;, :�:1t� c�: zo S t r ip a s  opposed :: o  sub'.':1ission or ap!)arcnt incl i -
vidual and l i�i:cd '=ss ive res is t ance o f  t�� • .  :�� res idents o f  t�e 
Sta�c o f I s r�c: s ince 19�8? 
:; ..J 
\·.':� Ll'" ::iuc:1 o f  our fortnco�:1i�6 an2lysis on the: ? <:? l .:.: s t inc 
rc.:s idc.:nts in t�c.: �c.:ve:ral ArDb s t a te s a�swers chis que:s � i o:1 in gc.:�-
c.: r.:. l ,  �;c,:r,e: s : <  : .. :.::-:t ?0 ir. :: s  re:::ia in of spe c ia l chara cte:r:.s cics o f  t:�e:se: 
a re:a s  to be: tacklc.:d here . (1) ,l. l though s ince 1 948 the West Ba:1k has 
bc.:e:n incorpra t c.:<l into the Jordanian kingdom and Gaza has co�c.: under 
E�yptizn adminis t r a t ion , the ma j ority o f  the residc�ts were P a ! e s t � n -
ians who were g iven autonomy to manage their a f fairs . Because of this 
fact and the locat ions of t�ese areas border ing I s r a e l , they rema ined 
in the same S? irit o f  pre -1948 . This interpretation shows up b e s t  i:1 
the history o f  events bet:._2n Gaza res idents and :he I s ra e l i  au:�or-
ities . These events show that there were always incidents of viole�ce 
between the two , and i�s peak occurred when Israel occupied Gaza . (2)  
With r e s  pc ct t o  the W e s t  Ban� , t . .  � ir resistance d o e s  not only sur>porc 
our assumption, buc a l s o  shows many other things . (a) Despite che 
t a c i t  unders tanding be twee:1 the Jordanian and I s r a e l i  govern�ents , and 
<les?ite the fa c t  c;1a c the West Bank w a s  incorpora ted into the Jordanian 
territory, :hey maintained their previous att itudes towards Israel , a s  
. 15 w a s  <le�onstrated by forming bases o f  organizational resistance . This 
is proven by Israeli mass ive ret a l i a t ion o� Guarters and towns w�ere 
organized l imited and local resistance took pl ace . (b) The e s t a b l ish-
ment o f  these organized a t tacks shows the independence of the Movement 
from the Jordanian rcgi�e . This inciepe�dence a cknowledges that inter-
a c tions between t�e P a l e s t inians of Jordan and those l iv ing in other 
c\1u n t r ie::; were : ..-: '. ·. � ·�� p l a c e . Therefore , the p r e - 1 948 a t t itudes per-
s is tc<l , but t h i s  t i:ne wit:-t closely knit groupings . .1.�· • .Jv<:h areas , 
1 6  
l1owcvc r ,  dc�ons t r a t io�s show spontaneo�� ,opular react ions . 
In h r i e: £ ,  three i:::?�:tant poi�ts a p p e a r  in the &��ve d iscus -
s ion : 
1 .  T�e: resistance in Gaza a�<l t�e Wes t Bank w a s  indcpcnde:�t 
fro::1 < .iny P.. rc'.liJ ;>o: i c i c a l  r e: ;; i:::e ,  <J.:d in s ome instances it a?? \::a re d  to 
be: an e:zte:nsion o f  w e l l -organi�e:d groups whose headquarters a r e  ou t ­
s id e:  Ca�a and che West Bank. 
2 .  The re s is tance w a s  s t ronger where I s r a e l i  re ta l ia t ion was 
na s s ive . 
3 .  The Pa l e s t inian cha racter o f  Gaza and c�e ·West Bank, and 
perpetuat ion of former a t t itudes towards Isra e l , contributed to the 
kind and t�c manner used to express their feel ings . 
The Psle s c �nians in the A rab Countries 
Prior t o  1921 , the P a l e s t inians were ?ursu�ng the same goals 
o f  t!1c peo?le under the Turkish occup a t ion . Their movement , the n ,  
w a s  a n  integral part o f  � n  overa l l  Ar�b movement �or independence , 
even though the P a l e s t inians had to f o l l ow a course of Arab national­
i s m  with more extens ive l o ca l  a c t ivit i�s due to the nature or develop­
me:;:ts that were taking place . 
Ti1e decision of the League of � a t ions o f  pl a c ing Syr i a , Lebanon, 
and Palestine under the leadershi? of Britain and Franc e . converted the 
a c t iv i t i e s  o f  t�e people o i  these countries from an Arab movement to 
localized movement s .  That i s ; a P a i e s t inian nationa l i s t  move�ent , a 
Syri.::in, nnd .::: T.e::):::nonese n a t iona l i.:; t  1r1ovemcnt became c l e a r ,  even though 
it seemed & t  t imes tha: the o�ly � .:.vid�ng l ines a�on; these movenents 
\.;c ...-e che r.1.:1::.:lo to�y powers . Consequently, the P a  l c:s � �·· .:..:;n problems 
<lur i:I� r::�c.: Eric is!1 :7.an<lCJt:c »Jere :he: corc e:rn o :  t:1e: P a i.e: s t inians i;-: 
thC; firs t.: ;>l .:: ce: u:1til the: \·1 it:1crawal o f  the: �ritisi1 forces ;.:ro:.: 
a nC;v; <.:ra in its i1i� .... 0ry. 
The: Po l cs tiniL�s ' P o l i t i c a l  Life in t�c Arab Countries : 1 9� 8 - 1 967 
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The: 1947 -1948 events between the milicant Zionist organiza-
tions and P a l e s t inians , plus the taccics used by these organizacions , 
did not le:ave the P a i e s t inians any choice o f  the country o f  refuge . 
Rathe r ,  they �oved to the country which was close to their o riginal 
place of residence , for two reasons : 
1 . T�cy moved within a short period o f  t i�e a fter the esca -
l a t ion o f  eve�r:s on the a s s umption that once the situation calne� down , 
they would return co their home s . 17 
2 .  The ma jority left in thousands in a panicky s ituation a f ter 
know ing of r:he Deir Yassin mas s a cre , in which ' '  . . .  there had been 400 
pe:oplc in this village , 50 had fled , three were s t il l  living, a l l  the 
rest !1ad been sys tcma t ic a l l y ,  and deliberately massacred . "  18 
7he Uniced Nations faiied to make Israel accept the recurn o f  
the re fugees . Aware of this fact , faced with their past experiences , 
the P a l e s t inians thought that their only hope to return to Palestine 
was t�rough the ir councries o f  residence in which they had rnany things 
in coa1mon .  A c cordingly, 1 1  • • •  Pales tL._ became an Arab problem durir.g 
the Li te 1 9!.;0 ' s 01�cl rc:-·:. :'..7icd at the centc:: r of intcr-Arah politics for 
the next two dcc;;;ccs . But P a l e s t i"1ian organizations , pa t·ties , and 
:e�J�rs:1i? ��:� only s econdary to the ?le:horw of Arab political move-
1 9  
r.1cnts . 
5G 
ThC: e:uucatcd ond intc::e:ccuais a�ong ?a�estin ians followed 
d i :: .'.: C: rc..:n L  � ir e: c t: ions in their count:rie:s o f  refuge . Sor.�e of tl�e::-;, 
j o ine:d t�c Jordanian political and admin i s t r a t ive �a c� :�e: r ie: s . Ot:�crs 
w i thin t:he: Jor<l<Jr.ian :,ingdom who die! not agree '� i th the ?hilos o?:-i.Y o f  
the: govcrn::lent �:.oved 1 ::,e the res t o f  :he� t o  Syria , I r a q ,  and Lcln.�;o� 
co j o in the p o l i t i cal parties o f  these countries that stressed Ara� 
. l ' 20 n<J t i.ona l.Sr.1 . A�ong the following political parties new and sh�rp 
divisions at t i�es occurred: The Arab Baath S o c i a l i s t  Party, t:he 
Syrian S o c i a l  X a t io�a l is t  Party, che � �ab � a t iona l is t:  �ove::le�t: , a�d 
the politico-rcli 3icus movement o f  the Muslim Brotherhoo d .  Accordingly, 
11 • • • once aga i n ,  these condi�ions dio l it i: l e  to foster a sense of pur-
<l . t h . p 1 . . 1 .  t i  21 pos e..: a n  uni. y among t e emerging a e s t ini.an e i t e . What these 
conditions did create was more ideological a l ienation among c�e di�fcr-
cnt competing fa c t ions , in which the bulk o f  the young P a l e s t in� ns 
participa ted . T�eir experienc� ended by marking another fail ing 
approach to solving their prob:em . Their failure , howev e r ,  can b e s t  
b e  understood b y  understanding t:he developments i n  those countries 
wi1cre they �ound thems elves an informal o r  unofficial part of thei� 
p o l i t i c a l  l ife , s ince the failure of a p a r t , which by its nacure 
h.:ippe•1dcd to b e  t.o c a l l y  dependent on the whol e ,  does not happen unle:ss 
by t�c failure o f  :he whole . 
T'.1e A !"ab Cot.:n::ries .:=nd :�e ?a:cs t inians 
r :  s o  �an; Pa: c s c inians j o i��� these ? o : i t :cal and some s o c i0 -
r e l i g ious rnove�c�ts in t�cir cou�tr--� o f  re�u3e , ��d i f  they inter-
1 ... -.:..! i;1 i.::10 i:1 : e rnal a : :'. a irs of t:i.ese countrie s , chey l:ave done s o  
only co be.: a � l 0  to a c c J�?iish through an overa l l  Arab n a t iona l is �  
�·ii1.:ic 1' a l e: s t ir:ia�1 nc:tiona l is ;"'.1 ,  cons ic!ering the i:--.terna tionai s i t u -
a t ion , fa ile:d t o  do ; c�at i s , t o  b e  a0�e t o  go back .:J�d l ive i� 
?alc.:s t ir:c . 
The Pa le s t in ian refu�ees s e ttled in the neighboring countries 
a t  a t i�e which �ey be b e s t  described as a p e r iod when chcs� countries 
were experiencing major s o c ia l ,  ec�no�ic , and pol : c ical trar.s �or�a cio�s ; 
a t ime: when, a fe:w years after inde?c�denc e ,  the: peak 0£ a se:a rc� :or 
ide:ncity existed . This s e a rcn for ice�tity, a f ter cencuries o :  co:o�i-
a l ism, coincided wich a n  i�c=ease :n e6uca t i o n ,  openess c o  wor:d ?rcb-
lcms , cve:nts , and socia l , econo�ic ,  and p o l i c icai philoso?hies that 
t.;crc a l l  weighed in t e rms or t':i.e existing r e a l i t ie s .  The:se rea l i i: i.::: s 
were rna �nly e conomic in e s s ence , y e t  had ind isputable effects on c�e 
intellectuals of c�ese countries a s  to their p o l i t ical a s p ira t ions 
and how t h e s e  a s p irat ions can be fuifil�ed . P o l i t i c a l  parties and 
socio-rel igious nove�encs were nu�e�ous , each of the� espousing a 
<.:irfcrcnt ap:_):.·".:,;.c."-i to bring about ·.:he ::-eal i z a t ion of an A r a b  unity . 
E;;icl;. o f  the:�"- idealiz .:::d t:he rights of t�1e indiviciua l ,  s o c i a l  equal:.ty, 
and f rce:do� of s p e: c ch , - • • � . \ , • 1 rc _ Lgion ana t:�e -i�c . Yee each o f  c�en d i s -
crc<litc<l the or::;.er and considered i t s 2i.. f t:1c only means to fulfill 
t:1csc goals . That i s ,  cooperation a�ong these p art ies and novemen t s  
w o s  l a cking . Lack o f  coo?e ration, coupled with inade�ua ce e cono�ic 
prog=a�cing, sca=cc resource s , and tribal and traditional divis ions , 
T:l�sc cv .::nt:s anci o l.:'.:e:rs �1ap?e:r.c<l a t  a t i::-,c when c'.1c ar;;-:y 
d t . . � . 1 . t . 2 2  a pp�arc o s�ou i� er�s� in p o _ 1  ics . ��o , other than t�e a r�y , 
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<lC:ve: lopr:le:i1t ar.ci t:1e: restorat ion of  Pa l es t ine ':! During t�;e: <le:cadc; i:-. 
wl1ich cou� cl 1 � � � � s  we:re t�e norm in sane Arab count�ies ,  ::hous an�s o f  
<i b i c  r:K:n l o s t  t:ne:ir livE:s , and a 1 1bra in-d::a in11 o f  de:velo?::.en t a l  rE:sou::-­
cc;s Look plac .:: . 
T'.Houg:10i.;t t':!e years , 1!ach pol itica l  party and s o c ia l  move:;.ient: 
re:?c.:a::e:<lly in t:heir ?lacforras , activitie s , and celebra tions ranked t�e 
rest:ora tion o �  Palestine a s  the first goal co ?ursue . Also , whe� :he 
of the: c ou·· . ..:ry, subs -.:: i:uted the mu'l.ti-party sys te� , t:hE: Pa 'l.es t: ine 
que:stion rc�ain�d OLe of priorit:y. Ye t ,  che con ce rned A rab countri0� 
neither acco::-.:-.�o<la"Ce<l the needs of i:he ?.;les tinians nor he l ped their 
goals . This may be explained by two points : 
1 .  �he Arab countries i�posed nany restrictions on the Pa le ­
s t in ians : 
(a) Pa l es t inians were not hired �or jobs unless t':1ey 
showe:d superior a b i l ity and if c it izens o f  the 
country were not av� ilable . 
(b) T�ey had no access to the formal po l it ica l s t ructure 
(?xcept in Jo rdan) and few were na tural iz ed , and 
( c) They were denied tie facilities o� travelling out ­
s ide the ir countries o f  residence . Only a few had 
the opportunity to do so and then after very compli-
c�t0ci proc0dur�s . 
2 .  Int��-��a� riva:ries ca�c to di� � � �  the A rDb countries in� 
iact i0ns op)0S��; eac� othc=, an� cons e �uenc ly the des tiny of the 
� � l � s t ini�� . was a ncvcr-�nd ing speculaciv8 �f�a i r .  Division a�o�g 
th0s0 councrics b e tween pro�ress ivc-revol u � ionaries and rca c t io�a riGs , 
a s  the la�c! ing wen t ,  was not conduc ive co more than �ani?ulat io� o f  
the ?alcs cin��ns s i�ply because c�ey (che Arab countries) could noc 
to the problc::i . 
The Ara�s · search for a new identity then, w a s  a c  :�e ex�e�se: 
o f  their pol itical s ta b i l i ty abd social and econo�ic dcvelop�c�t s  a:o�; 
which the Palestinians and their needs seemed to function o n  c�eir ?er i -
?hcrics . 
Howev e r ,  in a civil ized world , or s o  it is called , �he Unic�� 
�ations was crea ted to help solve worlrl problems . With respect to :he 
?alcs tinian question, the United �a tions ' a ct ions , politically speaki�g, 
did not go beyond resolutions passed by a majo::-ity o f  membe r  s tates 
a cknowledging t:-te rights of P a l e s t inic:ns co r::;turn co Pale:stine . 
T�a United �a: icns and ��e ?�les tine Quest ion 
The concern of the United Nat ions with the Palestine quescion 
goes back to 1947 when Britian decided co � ithdraw fro� Palestine . 
The UnitGd Nat ions e�tered the scene to find a solution to the �isp�te--
P a l e s t ine vs . Zionis ts . In ocher words , the United N z t ions took over 
the problen when :�e sy�?athies o f  Euro?e , tha Soviet Gnion, and North 
America were all  in favor oi the creation of the s t a te of Israe1 . 2 3 
of i.? o l -.: s t :.::e , �:1u t:;c :>arti::i.c:1 Reso:.ution o f  ?\ovc::-.:ie'!'." 2 9 ,  l <J47 wc:: s 
t::c Genera� .' . .:>s 2:-::b:.y 0 ::  
tent . The Polcs ti�ians c o � s � �  . i  i t  inco�?0t�n: because it ignored 
·_· ;:: ition 
o [  P a l e s t ine . I : s  unfairness was �us:ifi�� on the groun� c�a � : �  
aavc 31 percent o f  c�e to:a� population, who owned 1 5  percen: o f  t�e 
r 
land , 5 6 . 5  percent of tr.c·  _c:nd to be che J e\·rish s t a t e .  )
A f t e r  t�c cstablis�rnent o f  the S ta t e  o f  Israel , the tnite<l 
� .:i t ions tric� to �na ke Israel accept the return of ? a l e s tinians to t:-teir 
homes , but a l :  its efforts were in va in . 
Fro� t�c es:abl is�nent o f  che S : ate of Israel until che early 
1 9 50 ' s ,  any discuss ion o f  the problem � £  the area in the United �ctions 
was c�ntcrcd a round the rights o f  P a l e s t inians in returning to P B l e s t ine . 
A f t e r  1 9 5 6 , chc true nature o f  the problem was obfuscated wit� the 
A rab-Israeli conflict , and the ? a l e s t inians were r�ferred t o  a s  che 
i\e:<i r Eas t  rc:!:ugccs .  \{nat d i d  this tri?le-failure creJte ins ice the 
P a l e s t inians consider ing t�cir s o c i o -economic realities? 
The polit ical faccors of the P a l e s t inians themselves , che � � a b  
countries and t�c �nited Nations constitute only one s ide o f  the kind 
of l i fe t�e �alcs :inians live . The �ua lity of socio-e conomic life they 
liv0 in their places of refug� was and s t ill is a pr ime factor in t rying 
to discuss any <lcveiopments in order to give a true p i c ture and maybe 
some hints about the impact of such conditio�s . 
$3 
':: �t :  Soc :. a :.. C:!cl r:c��o:-. ic Cond i t ions 
: i�e bearable: �c a ti�c charac-
�C?e c�a t c�e future �ay ba �eccc r .  
But the: futur� is u�known a�d i� ��Y very well b2 che produce o f  the 
2re:se:n t . S t i.l: i.. , t·:--.c survival ins :: inct ::1ay p rcr.:ote a brighter p :.cturc 
o [  t:H:.: .fo c .. . . .:::re bor-;-. in misery, : ived in oisery, 
D nd <l ie.:<l '.) . . � , , . ..:.  o .... r • ...... ;.,:, .... ·. · '-vE:n before c�ey ma tu r e d .  A c  che S C.  ::te ;:: 1.:7.E: , 
unive:rs&l ?C:a c e ,  social and econorn:.c justice , civil and tunac rights , 
e.:qual op�ortun:.cy, a�d s e l £ -dcter�ication were an� scil: are c�e 
rhetoric of the ti�c . 
The dis?la cement � :  , c :es t inians in 1947 - 1 948 marked only che 
beginning o f  an c;isode of their iives anci the : :.ves o f  later genera -
t ions which can only be described a s unbearable for the great majority 
of them. 
The educa ted and chose who were lucky and had some training 
immigrated to <l iffcrenc countries wherever they could sup�orc chenselves 
and their iamilies . Thousands 0£ young P a l e s t inians are now working in 
d i f ferent ?ublic and privace enterprises anywhere they found j o b s . Bt;;:: 
for the raaj ority of then, life has bee� iden t i f ied with disea s e s , mai-
nutrition and hunge r .  They have been l iving on charity and dona tions , 
the: only ti1in2 'i·hich procect:ecl then fro::l s :: arvation . Wh ile the average 
world incake of c�iories is 2 , 500 , it is only a r�und 1 , 500 calories 
ror over a mili io� P a l e s t inian rcf�sees . 26 
: i'lfing conditi0:1S , t!·;c ur:av.:; i!.c:.hi.:'.. ity o :  
jo�s , �nd poor e cono�ic c0��it:io�s �ave produced 2 ra::c o f  infa nt 
:::Ol"t'1 l i ty . 
, I t')-
11 • • •  D:..:rin:; '.:'.H:: long su�nC;rs , dchydra t:ion and ::-:a l:-iut'!:"i.tion 
a re: no ::-:n.:il'!.:; th.:: ��.os t se:vc;r<:: �.::dical probl c:::s faced by i..-:\R' .. ?.\ s cc : f : . 
SomC; 32 ?Crce:�t (503) of a l l  re?Orted �e a th s  of refugee chi:�re:� �ge: 
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s ix Dn<l youn�cr c�• r ir.z 1 97 0  �·;ere du.e to diarrhea: <l i s c::a s e . "  
�oy ,  1 950 , the: s o l e  agency t o  care a�out the � a l c s t ine ref�gce: pro�-
l e:�s . Contribucions t o  func the age�cy ' s  progra�s have b.:: en co�::.�g 
fro� gove:rn�e:ncs , ?rivate organizatio:-is and hu�anitarian a s s o c i a t io�s 
ti1roug':1.out the \-;orJ..d .  ':lhe:se contrioutio-:1s range fro;:i :ooc-s cuffs and 
clothing to mo:1ey contributions . The fol lo�ing table shows co a grea t 
Yeor 
Ending 
June 1 9 5 1  
Jt..n...: !.952 
June 1 9 5 3  
Jt:nc 1954 
June 1955 
.Jun� 1956 
7 / 5 6 - 1 2 / 5 7  
Dec .  :i. 958 
D.:.! C . 1 9 5 9  
D...:c .  1960 
D�c . 1 9 6 1  
D..;...: . :962 
De:c . l 963 
D�c . 1 9 6!.. 
D1..: c .  1 9 6 5  
0C;c.; . 196C 
Dec . 1 �67 
De c .  1 968 
D...: c .  191)9 
. .. 
lliRWA Ezpen<li::ur:es on ?zles t ine Rc fi1 g e es by 
�ear and Registered Po ? � l a t ion 2 6 
Rc g::.s te ::- _.:. 
Po?ula�ion 
8 7 9 , 667 
881 , 6 7 3  
8 7 : , 748 
857 , 0 58 
905 , 986 
922 , � 7 9  
93 3 , 5 5 6  
9 6 3  ' 556 
9 90 ' 131 
::. , .J l 6 , 0Q 6  
::. , 0 39·, 996 
1 , 0 5!.. , 66.J 
l , 07 9 , 988 
l , ::. 0 5 , 395 
1 , 1 2 5 , 7 2 5  
-_ , -_:..5 , :_!._,7 
1 , 1 7 3 , 767 
1 , 1 55 , 236 
1 , 14 6 , 017 
}IE lions 
o i  Dol la ::s 
33 , 5 98 , 97 2  
28 , 5 7 3 , C .: 3  
2 6 ,  7 7 8 , S34 
29 . 1 92 , 0 1 2  
29 , 222 , 705 
3:. ) :;_ �8 ) 550 
·'· 
- ?  I ·' I • '> C, h  ::> _ , ..,. 0...;. , _ J 'J  
3 2 , 7 7 7  , 5 64 
35 , 0 1 5 , 817 
34 , 57 4 , !.60 
3 s , o s : , 52 1  
3 5 , 688 , 844 
36 , 207 , 0 7 8  
37 , i. 9 2 , 861 
37 , 618 , 4 7 2  
3 7  J . 9 3  ,420 
40 , 540 , 6 9 3  
4 3 , 987 , 10 5  
4 4 , 264 ,000 
$ Per 
Person 
Per Year 
30 . :. 9 
32 . 3 7  
30 . 7 1  
3 2 . 91 
3 2 . 26 
34 . 91 
37 . 9� 
34 . 00 
3 5 . 36 
3!.. . 1 3  
37 . 55 
3 3 . BL. 
3 3 . 5 3  
3 3 . 66 
3 3 . 4 2  
3 2 . 7 5  
::4 . 54 
38 . 0 8  
38 . 6 3  
Ce::-tt s  
Pc1· Day 
Per P e rson 
10 
09 
08 
09 
09 
10 
l.O 
0 9  
10 
09 
10 
0 9  
0 9  
0 9  
00 
09 
10 
11 
";..:;10\.::·.t o :  � .for l.8 r:;c:ic�s eke to s,·; it: c:-:ir.g o =  .f i s c a l  ye a r . 
·�5  
�zt�nt t�c.: � � n <l  o f  � i �e: hund reds o f  tiousands o f  P � l c s c inians have: 
been l iv �ng for t�o <le:ca �2s . �hsse su�s �ave been spcnc on c�uca t ic� 
: . . .  ic daily protein rc. _ _  .. .:.::-c:.�..::nts . 
The p r e c e d ing table shows several things a bout e n c  ��iu��c 
problc.:rn: 
1 .  The average per capita da ily expendi ture s do not exceed a 
few cent s . and do not take the individual beyond the subs�scence leve: . 
This s i tua t ion co�? 2 l l e d  the a ble persons to look 10r �eans co SU??Ort 
their families ��erever it was pos s ibie . But s ince only che young 
gcn� � � t ions have been equipped w ith necessary require=c� = s  for the 
j obs , i t  means tha � the bulk o f  those over twenty-five y_2rs o f  age 
a rc dependent ?a rtly o n  the Agency . This a l s o  sugge s t s  that i� :he 
refugee s  had not been su?port ing themselves , they would noc have been 
able to l ive unt il now s imply because of weather and other natural 
conditions as O?posed to hous ing .:;cco::t--:�o d a t: ions . 
2 .  The :a s t  increase in the birth rate has outs tripped t�c 
available funds . This increase a ccounts for 684 , 5 97 bir ��s iro� July, 
1 95C to June , 1 9 6 S ,  a net po?ulation increa s e ,  only of the registered 
population, of 543 , 747 pe�sons (deaths for the sa�e period accounted 
ior 
29 
140 ' 850) . 
3 .  A subs tan�ial nu�ber o f  refugees are not reg is tered with 
the l;"};RHA ;  t�1ey ere sel f-supporting. T!"le tota l number of refugees is 
4 .  The t£�:e does not include reg is tered persons �10 are not 
rcccivin� rc t ions a�d services . If we a re to include another qu�rter 
c.,nl:; P " r ;:  o 2  se::-vic...:s , 
')" 
'.. ill be: c.:ut C.:o�·;n to about 7 ce:n ts . .Jv 
The: t:nit.::c.i :\a t io ns Chart:E:r of Eu::-.e:n Rig h ts , w'.1 ich was put t o -
�e:::he:r by aole: ::1C;n a:-,d t·ior.,er. , com.::s c o  reL.ecc '.'lu:::c:n ne: ...:C.s a s  O??Ose:ci 
to ltum<in C:X?.:.: rie:nce:s . '.l':1E: fJl f ill::ie:nt o f  these n(::e::ds , or a ::: !. e: a s  t ::'.1e: 
i�?lC:�e:nca tion proccssc� :�a t iniciata a beginning in that <lire:c�ion, 
and therefore providing s o lu t ions :or these probl e::is . This C�ar::er 
in its ?resent for� is a co;u;-;-:on understanding , agreed upon by thC:: 
en t ire s ta t c s -ne:-.1o e:rs!:.ip of the Cor::::mn i t: y ,  which :neans a co:.unon uncie�"-
s tand ing that our probl ems have been ?E:rsiscent because o f  s oc ia l and 
economic inequ c: l icies , ma l trea tment s of one group by another, i gnorance , 
depr ivat ions , diseases and �he ii�e . 
The Declarat ion o f  the Rigtts of the Child as proc la imed by 
the lJnited :\'a tior.s on �overnber 20,  :i.';59 , a s serts tha t ,  if the child 
docs not "enjoy s�ecial pro tec t ion1 1  and is not "given opportur.it ies 
to enabl e him to develop in a hea l thy and normal manner and in condi-
tions of frecdo:n and dignity ; "  i f he is !10t " en c it:. l:d fro::l his birth 
to a :i.c:;71c ar.d a nat:iona l i ty , "  and i:: .'.1.:! has not been loved , has no t  
bc�n understood, and has not been given educa t ion , the child w i l l , in 
�11 proh�� ! : i : y ,  �cv...: �o� and grow up �aving ncga t iv...: a t ti cudas towa rds 
l . . 31 1is envi.ronmc:1 t .  What: ef.:'.ccts and pos s iol e ci<Jvclor;�e:nt� woulC.: this 
kind of l i�c ��vo on the ? � i c s � inians? 
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T>.cre: e::-: :.s :s a co::-::!on bel i.r:f :.n t':1E: oody o ::  \<.71ow:.e:cge: o .: ·  ?Ci :.-
tics t'.��:: i:: is not j-•>VE:rty 2s sue'.; \·::�ich csuses s0c:.al ar.d ?o:. :. :: :.ca:. 
u?he:ava ls ,  it �s ra t�e: = )ovcrcy and �eal::h s ide by s ile . .  I �  chis is 
t rue: , i t  �a; be: tea t  fruscrations a s  O??Osed t o  a s p i r a t ions , �ca � icie:5 
�s o�pose:d t0 �o a l s , and uni�e�city ar.d :he n�ecs for :.cicnc:.cy a l :.  ��/ 
oe: t:-1c.: s ource:s ... :.c:. t s:12:)(:: the r.::l a t ion5hi?s of pE:oplc c:ncl t'.1e i r e:wircn-
mcnt if thes e conciicions pre:va il , s in ce: a s ? irations , goa : -� t ta :.n�cn t ,  
<rn<l ide:n tity :.. -:1..; crite:ria o f  any nurr.an cor:.::-.uni ty . 
The.: P � � c s t ir.ians were u?rooted and the United X a t ions ' �ocly-
pol i tics did not e£fe:c::uate its resoiut ion o f  allo�:.ng their re:�rn, 
�'.)on wh ich t;-.c ?a l e:s t :.nians b-...i i l t  a sense of suspic ior. o :  r:1e T.Jni:.z:C: 
N a t ions which cons t i tuted no fa ith e i ther in it or the forces do�ina t­
ing :i. t .  
U:?on the .£i=st United ?\ a t ions failure to re s p1md to the i;.; ii.l o :  
Pales tinians to retLrn t o  their country, it �a� condit ioned that t�e 
�ales t in ians aciE?t to a s ituation w�ich they could do nothing about. 
P ol it ica lly , they shaped thenselves a c � ording to their environnent 
which meant ano ther blow to their goal s .  In Israel they are sus pec t ed , 
distrusted, and t�ey live as second - c l a s s  c it izens under s tr ict �il i ­
tary co��rol ; they can oniy get �enial jobs . Their economic l ife 
speaks ror itsel f .  A na t ional ident ity is a sense o f  secur ity and 
prid0 . The Pales tinians were deprived of these feel ings . 
Considcr i�s t�ese conditions ) desp ite the existence o f  the 
: :1 ::; t i cu;:ion.:"'.. s t ::uc t-.. ri2: o r  gover:::-: en t !:o solve their problem. 
�ul t i tu<l� � �  �ns�ccess �u: a :: ::e�p =s co realize their �lti�atc goal 
<lc.;<:i<lt:<l t o  t�ke; ti1e: initia;:ivc of seif-<lL:termination by an ar::1ecl 
re:s is t'"nce: . 
The: P a ! es t inians , then ,  w��;:her those: ��o : ive in or those 
who l ive: CLtsidc i � rael , were excluded frora p 2 r :: ici?atin; in the 
s y s t e m .  �:1is notion, cons t ituted a co�?lete breakdown of posit ive: 
co:. :-:.un ication 0etwcc:1 ::.sraeL.s anC: ? a l e: s t inians . :n this kind of 
s itua t ion , viole�ce may flare up at any t i�e . 
In :�is c�apte r ,  we d is cus s ed the Palestine refugees ' p o l i ­
t i ca l ,  soc ial , anci econo:::ic life i n  the Arab \·;_o rld and the roads chey 
hove: followed co pursue their goa l . We a l s o discussed che P a l e s t inians 
remaining in Israel s ine� 1 9�8 and those whq live in Gaza and the Wes ;: 
Bonk , showing the feeling of  genera l  discontent among them. We: elab­
orated about the effects of the fa ilure of  the Arab world and the 
World Co;·.1munity t:o a c cor.noda te them. Tr.is i-;as cone a l l  in essence to 
s c ...: \·ihy the P a le stinians s ta rt ed o rganized a rmed s truggle a ga ins t  
Israel . In brief , we dis cus sed che circumstances that b�ought about 
the prcst:nt s t a i:e of affairs . 
In che followi�g cha pter , we w i l l  discuss the ideological 
o[ c:1c P o l...:s t i:1e Rc!> isc;:;:-.c2 . ':::';;c d is cus s ion w i l l  c.:.ke into account ::-'.1c:: 
ch� avail�Y .. ...: sources in ou:: hands . 
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-�iilia� B .  Quandt ,  ?ales t i�ian �z : ional is� : I : s  Political 
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t�e:y can�o c so CXCC:?t co spe c i f ied places in -ch� per�i-c . ( 2) Th2y are 
<l i :owed t o  chai'.6C t'.1e ir p l a c e  o f  residence only a :: t.;r a c qu i ri:lg a 
written permit from the �ilitary aut�orit ies . (3) Curfew . 
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aut�ori:i2s to c l i�in�:c che laws ctac i�f:-inge upon t�e A=abs ' b a s :.c 
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1 97 2) , ? . 7 . (?or 
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J.e ::u2�es �oCa\', Q2o ci� . ,  
a �  abridged v2rsion o f  the 
'\' O 7 J  ( 7·•ly .:c - -.. t: e""', - �  .i. • v \..:.. - ...i '-=r' -.i.v c , 
Declaration of t�e Rigits 
for e: :�1tc0n years c�e ?a : e s t :..::ia:: Arabs �acl �ep�n�c� 
on .-'-.ra0 s :l .:.:.:s a::d 1:.-. .:: · .. orlci co:-:-_�·..lnicy c.· :: nat :..on::. , 
wor�ing tirou gh i:he Unite� �a : ions and �ha &rca� pc�e:::s , 
�o r.:::so�va their co:: f : i c t  w:..t� : s ra e : ,  bu: :h:..s ho� no� 
�-io:C�(r.:<l in ·:: er:".\s o ::  brin::;in3 ;:>.::c. ca . T'.1e shock o f  A :-a0 
d(;.::c..CJ '.:  ir:. 2'u:w , l'.;;,7 .::nci t'.;.::: . . .... eq:.:.2:-:::: occu;-:ia : :..0:1 o f  
Ara� :.::::::ito=y by Israel hts c�a�ged £ 1 :  o :  :h:s . Tta 
Pa:cs: :�ian ;r&�s w2r(: &�a��n(:� :o :�e ��c� :ha: ii 
th�y w��t :cedrass :or :�a i�ji.:St:ices :�a: :�ey be: ievacl 
tl':e:y :1ad st::fo::(:d , t'.-:.ey :nt:s c l:i.:::.;ir: do i�g :r.i::gs :o:: 
t:1e.-:1sclv�s . 
Jo:rn H .. D£vis 
(?or:-:1e r Co;·:.r.1i s s ioner Gi=.:neral of L:\RK�.) 
Congressionc: Record - Senate June 3, 
1970 (S325l,) . 
In c� is chapter,  ou= a:;alys is wi�l deal with issues within the 
context o f  the fol lowin� cwo p ropos it ions : 
l .  Shared �oals bring a group ' s  fa ct ions c l o s a r  together and 
:> trcngtllcn ther:1 naking i::he pursuit of :;1eir goa ls more eff eci:: ive; but 
contradicting £ ??�ca ches and i� � :o g:..es rnay weaken che organiza:ion 
and s ? l i t  it & ?a r: , and co�s��uently render i:s goai unreachab:e . T�� 
P�;lcs tinian orgc:iniza .:io:ts may be t::1e v:..ctims 0£ such im::ernal fractur-
ing because o f  c:1c va r iety oi a p?ro.:. c:· ..... s to realizing the ir common 
go .:? l . 
2 .  �).;s;;; i.vc c -.:  .:; c : ive gro1.:j) ::...: s istance may be the outco:ne o f  
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... , i <J ... .. o :  the above �entio�ed criteria can p:ovi�e the necessary 
momentu� for violence, so�e other hig�ly-valucd thin� such a s  co�n�ry-
identicy �oy overshadow a l l  ot�e� t�ings 2nd call for a rmed re s is cz�ce 
whose consequences arc not defined . This is true £or the P a l e s t inians . 
To the Pales tinian, the homeland l ies in the center of h i s  basic ex i s t -
cnce and i t s  loss renders l ife meaningle s s . The a s s ertion o f  his 
rights through fighting to regain h i s  country -identity is �ost l ikely 
to generate chains of violent events . These events may lead to goal 
a tt a inment , abolition of the group , perpetuation of the existing s ta t e  
o f  a f f a i rs , o r  a co��romis e . 
The Sue� c r i s i s  o f  1 956 and the June War of 1967 proved to the 
P a l e s t inians that the l iberation o f  P L l e s t ine is a matter that cannot 
be a ccomplished by t�e Arab countries . The A�ab countries that a�e 
directly involved in the problem are poo r ,  have obsolete military 
tra ining and pro grams , have agrarian-based economie s ,  and do n o t  have 
a unified defense system. With t�e persis tence of these conditions , 
the Arab countries have l o s t  and are bound to lose in the future any 
encounter with Israel . The reason is that Israel is wealthy, indus -
t r i a l ized , and advanced technologically, has modern weapons systems 
.- ,: training.
1 
hi'ith this view in mind, the P a l e s t ine Resistance 
developed and Pales t inians insisted on taking the initiative from the 
Arab countries by organizing their own efforts . Accordingly, many 
organizat ions came into existence mainly a fter 1 967 . 
Cor:c..:: :-:1in3 th.:; first propos ition, we will take each group 
in<lcp�nJc� t l y  t� ��scuss i� :n ter�s o f  the circumstances that brought 
it abou t ,  its orie�tation and relations with other group s . Through 
74 
recent p a s t  cicvc:op�cnts �e w i : l  show the d i s a g reements c�ac ezist 
among che different £actions of the �es iscance . 
The P o l c s t inian leadership in the p o s t - 1 9 6 7  era co�prised new 
p<;rsona l i ties with new approaches , but there rema ined major differ-
t:ncc.:s amen� th<;m with rE:s?ect to the means they should ... ... _>:oy to 
realize their go a l . That is , a new ciynamic but divided leade:rship 
came; to the scene of events , creating ir:t. .. nediate chaos and potential 
r<;straincs for the Re s i s t ance through nu�erous factions each of which 
formed ics ovm orgc:�izac ional s t ructure and. follm.;ers . Each one o f  
th�sc organiz a t ions differed from the ocher in its theorecical and 
id<;ological orientations with res?ecc to the ciegree of rigidity anc 
time clement w i thin which it intended to carry out its a c t iv i t ies . 
Those t:1eoret:ical and ideological d i fferences :nanifesced the:ns elves 
in open and so�c t i:nes bloody opposicions o f  each other along ttvo l ines . 
One l ine w a s  that the liberation of Pales tine is a part o �  liberat ing 
the Arab masses from reac�ionary leadership , the idea espoused by the 
l c f t i s c s  s u ch as George Habash (PFLP) and others . The s e cond approach 
. .. 
w a s  that o f  the P a l e s t ine· National Li::ieration Movem� n t  (Fateh) . �a teh ' s 
concern was t o  get a l l  the financial and popular support from the Arab 
2 
countries without any form of control over i t s  a c t iv � t i e s . 
The Emergence o f  Va r io� �  Orga n i z a t ions 
Due to t:1e emba rrassment of defeat in the 1 9 6 7  w a r ,  che Arab 
countries co;.;:. d 1·,ot .:.:r::<.' !'> t  the activities of the P a l e s t inians , espccial:! .. y 
in 1968 and 1 06 9 ,  bu� craated some P a l es t i n ian organ i z a t ions to be used 
as tools in t��-:: �ands and encourage� c:�ers whose approach is to 
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t: r<J nsi' or;:i c:. : l  t:1e: i-. ;:-ab cou:1t!."ies ir.to " revo:.. t.:'.::. iona ry" re: gi:ne s. A t:  
lcc;st f ourte:e:n ci ifferent orga niza t ion s ern.:rg ed . )1ost of i::�em rc:::a !.!:e; d 
rhet orical in sco?e , with th e bulk of � ctivitie s a ga inst Israel being 
carr ied out by Fo tch , P�LP , a nd PDFLP : 
�c; t:e:� : Id eology and O�je c c ives 
The Pa lestine Na tional Libera tion �ovement (Fa teh) sta r ted 
its op�ra tions a ga inst I srae l  on New Yea r ' s  Eve o f  1 964-1965 with a 
de:<lica te<l group of 8 2  comna ndos.after a f ew yea r s  of prepara tion and 
re connaissa nce �issions insid e I srael. 
The pur ? ose of Fa�e h' s opera tions have been to ( l) " . . .  present 
the Palestinians ' ca use to interna tiona l public opinion a s  a cause o f  
liberation, 1 1  a nd to prepa re t}1e people f or " . . .  a r med revolut iona ry 
a c tion ; "  (2) a scertain the P a l e stinia n cha ra cter of the problem a nd 
11 • • •  pr ev ent a tt empts by the Ara b r egi�es to conta in the Pa lestine 
struggle;'1 (3) estab lish ba se s f or re sista nce in the West Bank a nd the 
Gaza S trip; (4) take back the initia tive a nd r end er the proble m i t s  
origina l na tur e ;  tha t  is, to show tha t the problem is not ove r  disputed 
borders be tw een. Isr a e l  an_d A r a b  sta te s; (5) _ ' 1  • • •  giv e the u pcoming gen­
era t ions th e op?ortunity of getting used to taking u p  arms a nd t o  
acquaint th em wit:n t�1 e Pa lesr.inia n soil t�u ough a rne d ra ids.1 1
3 
After the 1967 war, Fateh communica t e d  its conte ntions of 
res ista nce in or d er t o  pre par e  th e Pa lestinia n people f or t he long and 
h.:ird cor: [:-o:1 t c t io:i. wit:-i 1.s'!."�cl to . .:ain its goal. i:'<i teh stressC:<l the 
nee d  of pol i t ica l ar. d arme� s trt.:s gl e. 
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T'.-1e: 1 1po!.:.tical s t ruggl <:::" acivocc:ted by ?ate;h coilcc.::-itr<:tcc o:: 
sc.:vcral cioa l s . ?irs t ,  c�e pol i�ical socializa �ion 0 £  ?a� (::s c ini.a�s 
in ordc.:r to rGcruit the able and will iilg individuals and indoccrin��e 
the youths to oc.:co:nc potential recruits for t:�e }1ovei:1e:::<t . T'.1e 11Ashbal11 
( "> you'·h o � r,.., ..., , ,,, � · ·.1." o ,.., ) ' 1 '0 <;:  A "f"' -:. :- - �, ,:  .::c ... t" "' C"  u '"- .. 0� . .  -�c.. w •' \\ i... w '- &o li,;iii.i \.. �� .L Ji. • l a ..,  r: -:  1Jring 
about a new unde:rstc:.r .... :.r.6 for thei.r Kove:::ent throug:-t o rga!li . .  � i�:or-
matio:-i c.:Hn?ai6ns in the A r a b  wo rlc. a s  well as in the Western worl d .  
Third, to be ab l e ,  in the long r��, to mobilize the Arab masses bc�ind 
the Movement . Fourth , to raise funds f��� Arab regi�es and private 
pa r t ie s ,  especially Pales tinians , for the support of families whose 
heads have died during b a t t l e s  and to finance oth�r proj e c t s . 4 
The 1 1 a r:-11ed s t ruggle11 was initiated as a suppl emenc to the 
political s truggle through which the Movement meant to make its final 
commitment in deal ing with the problen. The a r�ed s t ruggle consisted 
o f  a t tacking the Israeli forces in hie and run operations , destroying 
military an<l industrial in� t a l l a t ions , recruiting and t r a ining men, 
and collecting and bµying weapons . 5 
Both politic3l and a rmed s t ruggles have been launched in an 
e f fort t o  establish a non-sectarian democratic s t a t e  in P a l e s t ine where 
every c i t izen Chris t i a n ,  �o slem, and Jaw can live as e�ua l s . 
Fa=eh A f ter June 1967 
The impac: of the 1967 War has contributed to making every 
l iving P � l c s t i�ia� either a refugee or l�ving �nder the o c cupying forces . 
This fa c : ,  cou,:c� �ith a �odcra t e  a?p�oac� �y Fatch leaders a f t e r  a 
?eriod o ;:  c i ;:1t y.;ars , a!1d the co:nr::a:1do a t :c:cks aga i'ilst I s ra e l ,  nade 
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F a  t(;'.1 the: :;10s i: ?Opular and inportani: co:n::1anco organiza t ion ar.·.::-::2; • t:-:.c 
oth�r organizat�ons and the A rab countrie s . It wa s ab out nid �larch 
o f  1963 , z[ter �he Israeli a t tack on co�an<lv bases in A l -�a ra�eh in 
Jordan , \·J'..C:1 t:1e:: ?<:. teh 1 S inf:uence anc ?Opularity became grea te:r . 
Fa te:h gJ inc<l its influence and popularity not only b ecaus e  of its 
co;r..�Jndo activities , but also because it co:Tl::lunicate<l its nat iona� is t  
ide:logical a i�s to the people in a way that enabled the average Pa:e-
s tinian to understand and identify h��sel f .  The cohesiveness of i i: s  
l ea dership and i t s  <lecla �a t ion �f <lis i:tteres t in interfer ing i n  i:1!:e r -
Arab a ffairs gave it the opportuni�y to expla in its ne::hodological 
approach and objectives with which the bulk of P a l e s t inians became 
acquainted . Accordingly, its ne;11bers�ip increased substantially after 
t�� A l -Kara�eh a ttack and ic was e s t i�ated in early 1 970 to exceed 
10 ,000 a r;nec! 
6 
men .. 
A l though Fa!:ch became influential and strong after 1 % 8 ,  many 
problems retarded its growth from �ithin and from without . The prob-
lem of unit ing the different commando groups and encountering the 
Jordanian regimes without los ing what i t  had a c cm�plished was a salient 
problem. However,  Faten ' s  efforts with other commando fa cr:ions opened 
n new <liDlo:;uc even i:hough it ended with little succes s .  As far as  
their s itua t ion in Jordan was concerned , the com.":1andos only enjoyed 
ircc ��ncuvcring Oj the Jo�danian soi: from June 1967 through i:he third 
qua rter o f  1 9 6 9 . Th��ea fter, the Jordanian regime s t a r t e d  encountering 
t�1c co:11m.:rndo o c t iv it ics un-.:ii i t  was ended by a majo-:r b a t t l e  b � twe:E:n 
the govc rn:r:cnt a:1d t'.:� cor::::landos :.:-, S.::?=e:-.�!J�r 1 97 0 . The results were 
thous.:inds of deaths and the cisr:-.antling of any substantial com.-nando 
bases in Jordan . 
A c  a time when , in t�c l a c e  1 9 50 1 s ,  the present � a ce� leade r -
ship w a s  C::nterta ining t:1e idea o f  s e l f -reliance in pursuii.lg t::e ? a : e: -
s � inc que s t ion , another faction w a s  for�ing around a cotally d i fferent 
orientation. The Arab N a t iona l is t  Move�ent, supported by Egyptia� 
Pres ident Xas s er , found responses among the incellectua l s , e s pec ia l�y 
the young Pales tinians . The A��l 1 s  approa ch to the P a l e s t ine proble� 
was through Arab unity , which came as one major contradiction with 
fa teh ' s approach. During the �id-1960 1 s  a s p l i t  between Na s s er and 
the AX:1 occurred when the fo ri:".C:r tried to incor?o rate the lati:er into 
the Arab Socia l i s t  Union, and ·consequent: y ,  the P a l e s t inian leaders 
in the A�lM ,  after a period o f  qua rrel s ,  =ights , and com? e: t i t io n ,  
formed what i s  presencly known a s  the PFLP headed b y  George Haba sh . 
The c rea t ion o f  the PFLP was p receded by a wider gap b e t\veen Fateh 
and the Baai:hist govern�eat in Syria . The ra?procheQent talks bet�een 
Fateh and th<; leaC.'2:rs who later on fo rrr,ed the ?FLP concerning the pros -
pects for a unified. command drifted along the division between Fateh 
and the Baa th Party of Syr ia . Howeve r ,  the leadership of George Habash 
<l id not s e e� t o  live up to the expectations of the younger and more 
sophis ticn ted "i-1a n:ist-Leninis t oriented influentia 1 leader in the PFLP , 
Naycf Hawa t�eh , who defied Habash . The E&watmeh-Habash conflic� created 
three splinter group s ,  the PDFLP , Hawa tneh faction, was the s t rongest 
a1.1ong the splinter group s . 7 
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Ideology of PFLP and How It Differs From Fateh 
As bel ievers in Arab unity as the only sound means to liberate 
Palestine , the PFLP leadership stressed two point s :  
1 .  It refused the direct
_. armed struggle used by Fateh as a 
means to their goa l s  and a dvocated organizational planning as the 
stage preceding the use o f  violence . However, due to competition and 
in order to gain popular suppor t ,  the PFLP found itsel f drawn into the 
mainstream of Fateh ' s  doctrine ; that is , using violence before any 
preparatory phase , especially when it failed to establish its own 
underground centers in the West Bank and the Gaza S t r i p .8 
2 .  The PFLP ' s  a t t itudes towards Arab regimes represent a 
major principle of its workability. The leadership contends that s ince 
Palestine is an integral part of the Arab world, its work ought to start 
oppos ing those Arab regimes whose orientations are incompatible with 
that of the PFLP . This approach deprived the PFLP of the ass istance 
of the wealthy tradit ional Arab leaders , and its resulting reliance on 
Iraq and Syria made it appear to function a ccording to those two regime s '  
des ires with respect to inter-Arab politics . 9 
The limited popularity o f  PFLP and its ineffectiveness may be 
attributed not only to its leftist doctrinaire orientation but a l s o  to 
the unwill ingness of the Palestinians as well as the Arab people to 
support such an ideological structure . The lack o f  acceptance of 
leftist-based movements by the society o f  the Middle Ea s t ,  even though 
the rhetoric of such movements appealed to the emotions o f  the people , 
may be due to the deep-seated socio -religious attachments o f  individua l s . 
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These socio-rel igious connnitments between the individual 
and his environment proved throughout the Twentieth Century that they 
were s tronger than political principles al ien to the society. lo 
A s econd factor may be a ccounted for regarding the lack of 
success of the PFLP . I t  stems from the insignificant contributions 
of the Conununis t parties to their respective governments .  All Conunun-
ist parties were and still are banned (except in Lebanon a t  the present 
t ime) because they were considered as subversive groups in the countries . 
Besides this stigma attached to them, they , according to their l ines 
of orientations (Russ ian or Chinese) , promoted non-violent processes 
regarding the Palestine question. By the late 1960 ' s ,  after more than 
a decade of existence, these parties and their approaches proved imprac-
tical for solving the issue. Therefore , the PFLP came at a time when 
the Pales t inians were saturated by colored rhetoric and were not ready 
to accept this line of a rgument any more . A t  the same t ime they had 
an alternative in Fateh which suited their direct\ needs . 11 
A third factor may be the fact that the PFLP came to the scene 
of events when Fateh was very well established, and when by the late 
1960 ' s ,  the Soviet Union was insisting on a political settlement of 
the issue, a t  a time when the Soviets were discrediting Fateh ' s  a ctions . 
Any leftist organization was doomed to fa ilure , s ince ideologically it 
was supported by either the Soviet Union or Red China , and since a 
political settlement was viewed by the majority of Palestinians a s  an 
international conspiracy against them a s  long as they were not considered 
12 
a part o f  the dispute . Furthermore , with such persisting approaches ,  
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the leftist organizations were not contributing to creating a 
Palestinian image . They rather perpetuated the self -defeating 
image of the realities of the Arab countries , whereas Fateh created 
the unique image of future Palestinian success without jeopardizing 
or divesting the individual ' s  pe��onal belief. 13 
Other Corrmando Organizations 
In the early 1960 ' s ,  the Baath· parties of Syria and Iraq came 
to power .  I t  was not long before the differences between the leaders 
of the two countries started to split them apart until the original 
Baath Party was identified by its two wings- -the right and the left 
wings . In the late 1960 ' s  the divis ions between Syria and Iraq 
became irreconcilabl e .  Sometime s ,  they went to extremes with each 
other; that is , to encourage military factions to revolt and/or ins t i ­
gate coups d ' eta t .  Both factions , the Syrian and the Iraqi, were in 
opposition to Nasser ' s  policies and leadership . This three-sided 
antagonistic relat ionship happened at a time when Fateh and the a rmed 
s truggle approach were gaining momentum among Palestinians a s  well a s  
Arabs in general .  The Syrian regime , not trusting the leadership of 
Fateh and discreting Habas h ,  coupled with inter-party confl ict , created 
the Saiqa forces . 
The Sa iqa gained membership and recognition of other groups 
within a few months . This fact may be because it sided with Fateh 
whenever inter-organizational conflict came about, and accepted the 
PFL: · · and PDFLP , the main opponents of Habash. Furthermore , the Sa iqa 
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accepted among its ranks a great number of non-Palestinians (Syrians) 
s ince it is located in and supported by Syria . During 1969 and 1 9 7 0 ,  
i t  became clear that the Saiqa was under the Syrian regime ' s  control . 14 
The early May events of 1973 in Lebanon between the Lebanese army and 
the corrmandos in which the Saiqa forces were the main group , coupled 
with the Syrian initiative of closing down the borders between Lebanon 
and Syria , was a solid proof of the Syrian control over the Saiqa 
operations and tactics . 
The Syrian initiative in creating the Sa iqa did not stop a t  
that level . On the contrary, in early 1968 , the Syrian regime arrested 
George Habash and encouraged his opponents within the PFLP which appeared 
later on by the formation of the PDFLP of Hawatmeh , and the PFL of Jabril . 
At this stage , Iraq, observing the developments and the Syrian 
maneuvering, wanted to have its own stake in the shaping of events ; and, 
to encounter any poss ible Syrian control over the Movement , created its 
own group , the Arab Liberation Front (AFL) . When Habash fled from his 
Syrian prison, he found that the Iraqi regime was will ing to support 
him. However, the AFL remained unknown and unrecognized by major 
groups , and its membership did not exceed a few hundred . 15 Meanwhile , 
a few other organizations such a s  the Palestine Popular Struggle Front 
(PPSF) , the Action Organizatfon for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) , 
....... 
and the Ansar were either recently created or in the process of forma -
tion. The allegiance of the PPSF and AOLP was to the UAR (Egypt) a s  
i t  appeared later from their programs . The Ansar was strictly a group 
of communist Palestinians supported by Moscow-oriented factions of the 
outlawed Corrmunist Parties in the Arab countries which neither gained 
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a large membership nor was recognized by ma jor organizations except 
for the PFLP and the PDFLP . 16 These groups were the main target of 
the Jordanian regime , a lthough Fateh ' s  activities were not spared. 
It was also bel ieved that these groups were the main factions that 
. ·  
instigated the 1973 May events in Lebanon. In both situations , the 
September events in Jordan and the May events in Lebanon , Fateh ' s  
leadership was the main faction to settle the disputes between the 
concerned governments and the Fedayeen . 
The Palestine L iberation Organization (PLO) 
One of the decisions of the Cairo conference of the Arab 
leaders of January, 1964 was the establ ishment of a Palestinian organ-
ization having the authority and power to manage and institutionalize 
the Palestinian affa irs . As a resu l t ,  " . . .  over four hundred Palestin-
ians from a wide variety of backgrounds met and charged Ahmed Shukayri 
with selecting an Executive Committee for the Palestine Liberation 
Organization .1117 The PLO at the ·time did not intend to function inde-
pendently from the Arab regimes ; and accordingly, the Palestine Libera-
tion Army, a convent ional type force , was created . The members of the 
PL� were recruited from Palestinians and were stationed in Egyp t ,  Syria , 
and Iraq. After 1967 , Shukayri was abandoned and Yahia Hammouda became 
...... 
the acting cha irman of the PLO . Yahia Hammouda tried to reorganize the 
efforts of the PLO , but it seemed that the PI.A {the PLO ' s  armed forces) 
was not a cohesive force and created inter-organization tens ions that 
weakened the position of the PLO and gained the Syrian enmity. In 
early 1968 , Yahia Hammouda called for a Palestinian Congress so that 
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a l l  existing organizations could meet and talk out their differences ,  
but his efforts were not successful . The meeting took place late in 
1968 with the absence of some factions due to the fact that some PFLP 
leaders were arrested by the Syrian regime , and the Saiqa leadership 
did t . . t 18 no participa e .  Furthermore ,  the persistence of the PLA 
mutinies did weaken the PLO, and s ince the other major groups were 
competing to gain more power and prestige before the fifth sess ion of 
the National Congress , Fateh and Saiqa were the two major groups to 
benefit from the PLO problems . Accordingl y ,  when the National Congress 
convened in January, 1 9 6 9 ,  Fateh had " • . •  the largest number of s eats , 
3 3 ,  followed by Sa iqa and the PFLP with 1 2  each. " . . .  Other organiza -
tions refused to participate, protesting the small number of seats they 
were given . 1 9  
The National Congress adjourned with Fateh making an impressive 
political victory and its official spokesman , Yasser Arafat, became the 
Cha irman of the PLO . The 1969 PLO ' s  executive membership was divided 
among three main groups , seven members of Fateh, three of Saiqa , and 
one of the old PLO Executive Committee. 20 
With a l l  these divis ions and maneuvers that existed among them, 
the different groups were waging their attacks against Israel placing 
heavy emphasis on their rights of self-determination. In the coming 
discussion, we will try to deal with events a ccording to our second 
proposition which says that country-identity may be viewed as the most 
important moving element behind a resistance . 
The Movement ' s  Confrontation with Israel and 
the Arab Regime s :  An Assessment 
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From May, 1949 until December, 1964, the confrontation in the 
Middle Eastern area of our concern (excluding the Suez crisis of 1956) , 
consisted of border clashes and a'inbushes , raids and retaliations , 
shellings , air strike s ,  and informa tion campaigns between Israel and 
the bordering Arab countries .  The Palestinians ' activities a t  this 
t ime did not go beyond a few conunando raids and significant recon-
naissance miss ions inside Israel . 
From 1965 until the present, and especially in the period after 
the June War, 1967 , until S eptember ,  1970 , the commandos activities 
mounted in effectiveness and encompassed a wide range of �eans . During 
the period between mid-June 1967 until December 20 , 1968 , 1002 conunando 
raids against Israel were carried out . A s  a result, 259 Israelis were 
killed and 10 , 005 wounded . 21 Most of these raids were initiated by 
Fateh . Other organiza t ions , and especially the PFLP , the PLF , the .. 
PDFLP , and after S eptember, 1 9 7 0 ,  the Black S eptemberists , executed 
actions such as hijacking and exploding planes , a ttacking Israeli 
embas s ie s ,  properties , officials ,  and other representatives abroad .  
I t  was natural that Israel would reta l iate . The Israeli 
reprisals cons isted of air raids , conunando raids, and shelling the 
Palestinians ' conunando headquarters and bases . S ince most of the 
conmando headquarters were located in the refugee camps and cities , 
th i · 1 . 1 d h I 1 °  1 · · 
22 
e c vi ians were a so expose to t e  srae i reta itory actions . 
A ccordingly, during a period o f  four years , from 1965 until 1969, the 
2 3  Arab and Palestinian casualties exceeded two thousand . 
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The Israeli raids into Lebanon, Syria , and Jordan caused 
considerable problems in these countries .  Accordingly, these con-
cerned countries , coupled with miscalculations on the part of some 
groups , affected, and in some cases ende d ,  the commando presence a s  
a group . 
In Syria , for instance, the commando activities were cut down 
to a minimum until the present time ; that is , the commandos were not 
a llowed to cross the Syrian borders to activate their programs . They 
were allowed , howeve r ,  and a t  times encouraged, to cross the Syrian 
boundaries to go to Jordan and Lebanon . 
In Jordan, from Jun e ,  1967 until mid-1 970 ,  the Fedayeen were 
operating under full autonomy and were recognized by the Jordanian 
· 
24 Th · d d . B h d f 1968 regime . eir autonomy starte to eteriora te . y t e en o 
and early 1969 the leftist organizat ions (PFLP ,PFL , and PDFLP) emerged 
and openly declared their enmity towards the King and his authority . 
Once the King o f  Jordan felt that his authority was threatened by the 
presence o f  these organizations , he moved against them using his mili-
tary forces a t  full potential with no differentiation between one com-
roando group and another .  Consequentl y ,  the confrontations between the 
two sides resulted in thousands o f  casualties among the commandos . 
Many commandos fled to Syria , Lebanon, Iraq, and even to Israel . 
' 
Another result was the birth o f  the Black September group . Henc e ,  the 
impact of these confrontations signaled the end of the Movement in 
2 5  
Jordan .  
Throughout the period between June , 1967 until the end o f  1968, 
the Fedayeen presence in Lebanon consisted mainly of their administra-
t ive headquarters where they launched their information campaigns and 
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recruitment centers in each refugee camp . Other activities were kept 
to a n  insignificant level . This s ituation changed dra s tically in 
1969 and increased by the end of 1970 . Why? 
After the Israeli attack of December 28, 1968 on the Lebanese 
. ·  
international a irport , the Lebanese government was faced with a frust-
rated and angry popular mood which paralyzed the governing process , 
and resulted in a chaotic situation throughout the country for more 
than six weeks . In this kind of situation, the newly-created Saiqa 
forces infiltrated the Southern part of Lebanon and started operating 
against Israe l .  Consequently , the Israeli retaliation was prompt and 
indiscriminatory at t imes , especially after the 1970 Jordanian crack-
down on the connnandos , when major cormnando activities were launched 
26 
through the Southern and Southeastern Lebanese borders . The Lebanese 
army found itself in a peculiarly humiliating position, coupled with 
some miscalculations on the part of some commando factions, brought 
about by the latest clashes of May, ·.1 97 3 ,  between the cormnandos and 
the Lebanese army . The fighting ended by a cease-fire through which 
the commandos '  a ctivities are now contained . 
As it appears from the above discussion, the Palestine Res i s t -
ance Movement i s  in a state of stagnation in Lebanon, i s  institution-
a l ized, controlled, and weak in Syria , and does not exist in Jordan. 
In I ra q ,  it is kept on a nominal level of effectiveness and more so in 
Egypt .  In Israel proper, the Movement never has existed a s  an organ-
ized group . Al though the Movement is presently cont a ined, there could 
be no doubt that it made some major accomplishments on d ifferent ievel s .  
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Ach ievements of the Movement 
It may appear at one time or another that it is hard to assess 
what the Pales tine Resistance a chieved throughout the period from 1965 
until the present . This difficul�y ,  however ,  applies only to the status 
of the Resistance with respect to the Palestinian population due to the 
near total lack of att itude surveys among the Palestinians . But with 
the little attitudinal information we have, and based on our analysis 
of the Movement so far ,  we may present the following points as s ome 
major a ccompl ishments : 
1 .  For the first time in recent history there existed an 
organized Palestinian Resistance Movement. Despite the fragmented 
nature of the Movement, it did restore the lost sense of dignity, 
prestige, and pride of Palestinianism and being a commando or an 
affiliate with and supporter of any commando group . This may be 
revea led by the majority opinion of a random sample of tenth-graders , 
Palestinian students ·in Jordan . Yasumasa Kuroda ' s  s tudy reveals that 
51 percent of the sample are directly involved in one organization or 
th d 30 t h . d "  t . 1 t 27 ano er, an percen s ow tn tree tnvo vemen . (This also shows 
the kind of political socialization the young Palestinians are exposed 
t o . )  
2 .  The Movement rema ins an important force'in Middle Eastern 
affairs-. It was and still is capable of retarding any political regime , 
socia l ,  and economic structure o f  any of the countries it resides in 
28 
including Jordan . 
3 .  An unofficial universal recognition of the Movement became 
a reality. Palestinians are now something besides refugees . Presently, 
8 9  
they are seen as a group that h a s  a potential to pursue its goa ls with 
the means it pleases . Some private and public bodies are aware of 
this fact and recommending that the Palestinians pl ight must be heard. 
This notion may be explained by a part of the recormnendations of the 
Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affa irs , 
United States House of Representa tives . This Subcommittee drew its 
report after listening to scholars of different orientat ions con-
cerned with the Middle Eastern developments : 
" . . .  The United States should watch closely Palestinian 
developments , be prepared to deal with them and support 
peaceful and viable ways to encourage expression of the 
Palestinians ' right to have a greater voice in their own 29 political future within the context of a peace settler:.ent . "  
4 .  The Resistance has a purpose and a program . The most 
respected influential and moderate group with highest membership in 
the Movement, Fateh, has been operating on a well -defined nationa l i s t  
ideological premise ,  from which it has not deviated . . : This approach w a s  
and still i s  used in pursuance o f  the purpose (a unitary non-sectarian 
state in Palestine) along which it had been indoctrinating its members . 
This consciousness has been not only among Fateh ' s  membership but also 
an a spect of the life of moderate Palestinians , knowingly that the great 
majority of Palestinians are committed to moderation . 30 
Surmnary and Conclusions 
A .  The Inter-movement Relationships 
The Palestine Resistance Movement has experienced throughout the 
period of its existence a series of developments cons is ting of several 
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divis ions along organizational and ideological line s ,  a chievements and 
setbacks , and a role to be reckoned with now and in the future . 
Prior to 1967 , it s e emed a s  if the Resistance triggered the 
events which led to the June War of 1967 . 31 A l s o ,  at that t ime , the 
Resistance was not known among the Palestinian circles . Even those who 
were aware of its existence, whether Palestinians who were not a part 
of it or Arabs , were skeptical about its credibility and intentions . 
During the post-1967 wa r ,  while the Arab countries were demora l -
ized after their humiliating defeat ,  the Resistance forces emerged as 
the only victorious group in the Arab worl d .  The more the Resistance was 
gaining momentum and prestige through membership, armament , finance and 
independence from Arab regimes and foreign influence , the more organiza -
tions , some active, others dormant, with diffe rent ideological orienta -
tions , became parts to it . The more divisions created by these organ-
izations , coupled with the att itude of the Arab regime s . towards them, 
and the Israeli retaliatory act ions , the less effective the Resistance 
became . 
Considering the numerous post-1967 organizations , the leader-
ships of the moderate ones called for unifica tion. Despite their call s , 
the Movement is still fragmented. By 1970 , the moderate organizations 
operated under a loose unified command, and the leftist organizations 
� 
still have their autonomy within their ideological framework . 32 The 
PLO , for ins tance , does not act as the 1969 National Palestinian 
Congress intended- -one agency managing the affairs of its parts . Rather 
each of these organizations still has its own offices and independenc e .  
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By 1972,  however, a better understanding among these concerned organ-
izations domina ted their relRtionships which may be referred to as a 
new perceptional development of the nature of forces that want to 
el iminate them. In other words , the inter-organization al ignments 
and a lienation among the different groups during the past eight years 
had " • . .  led to the inevitable delays and prevarications that postponed 
the achievement of national unity . 1 133 Thus , the contradictions approach 
of these factions have weakened the Palestine Resistance, and its per-
s istence may render their counnon goal unrea lized . 
B .  The Nature of the Palestine Resistance 
In their analysis of revolutions , social scientists and some 
world-famous politicians argue that the socio-economic circumstances 
that exist in a society are determinants of whether or not a revolution 
takes place . That is , people are will ing to revolt when they a re dis-
heartened by economic hardships , or when they perceive that the upcoming 
developments are a threat to their material well -being . This interpre-
tation may be true of the Palestinian Resistance when early under the 
mandatory government, the Palestinian farmers were revolting aga inst the 
new Jewish settlers . 34 But after the creation of the S tate of Israel , 
the face of the Resistance had change d .  The nucleus of the present 
Resistance as it came about in 1964 was only in response to the Pale-
stinians political apsirations a s  opposed to their deprivation of 
country-identity ; yet the Resistance was strengthened and ameliorated 
because of their social peoblems and economic hardships . This, however ,  
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should not suggest that if the Palestinian refugees were better off 
economical l y ,  the Resistance would not have became a s  strong within 
a short period of time '. Kuroda ' s  survey conducted on 234 Palestinian 
s tudents l iving in Jordan may explain this contention: 
" • • .  Even though they l ive ··under economic hardships of 
great magnitude , their concern to regain their home­
land is an obsess ion to them. This is well - illustrated 
in their response to the question of what they would do 
if they had an Aladdin! s lamp. Only one s tudent said 
that he wanted money . Twenty-three respondents indi­
cated their desire to satisfy their personal desires o f  
one sort o r  another, while the remaining ma jority wanted 
Aladdin ' s  lamp to bring back their homeland . 35 
The socio -economic life o f  the Palestinian refugees showed in 
many circums tances that it gave the Mov ement a great momentum . The 
nature of their dispersement coupled with necessities of l i f e ,  in many 
circumstances , caused members o f  the same family not to be able to see 
eacb other again. The limitat ions imposed on them, especially after 
1967 , created all the pre-conditions o f  revolt . 
Palestinians hold international identity cards . These cards are 
not accepted all over the worl d .  A Palestinian cannot enter an Arab 
country unless his tra ining and qualifications are needed and conse -
quently sent after by the concerned private o r  public enterprise .  Once 
s tudents finish a level of education and need to travel abroad for a 
higher level of education or even just to travel , they are not given 
entry visas especially to the Western world, and only the elitest few 
are able to travel in pursuance o f  their individual goals after exhaus t ­
ingly frustrating experiences . 36 
In this kind of s ituation, one would dare to say that Palestin-
ians have been indoctrinated on embitterment and hate o f  their environ-
ments for years , generation after genera tion. Accordingly, a restoration 
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of a dignified life will never come about unless by regaining Palestine . 
Furthermore , Palestinians seem to be determined on pursuing their goa l , 
where it may be easier on their opponents to remove them totally from 
life rather than put an end to their aspirations : 
" • . •  the resistance has many strengths , with which to 
prevail against the Jordanian regime , and against a l l  
the Arab regimes too, should they seek t o  obstruct the 
Palestinian revolution. For what de we fear now? In 
the past ,  we used to be anxious for our overrated
37 institutions . But now there is nothing to fea r . "  
Therefore, we cannot be sure of the degree o f  pressure exerted 
on Palestinians by their social and economic condit ions to wage the 
kind of resitance they advocate and carry out . However ,  the discus-
sion in this chapter concerning our second proposition reveals that 
they place great emphasis on rega ining Palestine . Their emphasis on 
the " l ibera tion" of Palestine by a rmed struggle , so far ,  a s  opposed 
to counter-resistance, caused the Palestine Resistance Movement to 
function a t  an ineffective level . 
FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER V 
1Political and Armed Struggle , Fateh: The Palestine National 
Liberation Movement, n. d . , p p .  3-4.  
2Ibid . , p.  7 .  
3Revolution Until Victory, .2£ ·  c i t . , 
4Political and Armed Struggle ,  .2£ ·  cit . , pp.  2 1 - 2 6 .  
5Revolution Until Victory, .2£ ·  cit . ,  
6Quand t ,  .2£· cit . , p .  1 2 .  
7Ibid . , p p .  16- 2 1 .  See also Sharabi, .2£· c it . , p p .  195-196. 
8Ibid . , p.  18. Also, for an interesting presenta tion o f  their 
differences see Sharabi, .2£· c it . , pp.  198-200. 
91bid . , p .  20. 
10For a broad analysis of the socio-religious aspects of Middle 
Eastern countries see Halpern, .2£· cit . ,  p p .  162- 1 7 5 .  
11Ibid. _, p p .  192-195. (For accounts about the obstacles to the 
success o f  Conununism in the Middle E as t . ) 
12About pacifist attitudes of Conununist groups ,  see Eric 
Rouleau, The Manchester Guardian, week ending January 2 7 ,  1973, p .  18. 
13Kha lid Al-Hassan, Palestine Lives : Interviews with Leaders 
of the Resistance, Palestine Books No. 40, (Beirut: Palestine 
Research Center and the Kuwaiti Teachers Association, 1973) , p .  2 9 .  
14
Q d . uan t, .2£ ·  cit . , 
1.Sibid . ,  p .  24 
16Ibid . ,  p p .  24- 2 5 .  
17 Ibid . , p .  27 . 
18Ibid . , p .  28. 
19 
Ibid . , p .  2 9 .  
20Ibid . , p .  3 0 .  
2 1  Near East ReEort, 
p .  2 3 .  
XIII, 1969, p .  3 .  
22The Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 1972, p .  3 .  
94 . .  
95 
23Barry M. Blechman, "Impact of Israe l ' s  Reprisals onBehavior of 
the Bordering A rah Nations Directed A t  Israe l , "  Journa 1 of Conflict· Re ­
solution, XVI , No . 2 :  (Ju�� ' 1972j , · � :  ' i8i . 
24 Abu Iyad, Pales tine Live s :  Interviews with Leaders of the 
Resistance, ..2.E.· cit . ,  p. 5 2 .  
2 5ibid . ' p .  5 1 .  
26The Christian Science Monitor, .22 · c it . ,  p .  3 .  
27 Kuroda, .22 · c i t . , p .  260. 
28 Joseph Churba, Fedayeen and Middle East Crisis (Maxwe ll Air 
Force Base, Alabama : Air Unive rsity Documentary Research Study, 
1969 ) ,  p .  3 .  Clovis Maksoud , Palestine Lives : Interviews with Lea­
ders of the Resistance, ..2.E.· ci t . , p .  7 .  Also see The Middle East 
in Crisis : Problems and Prospe c t s ,  Report of the Subcommittee on 
the Near Eas t ,  92nd Congres s ,  1st Session, 1 9 7 1 ,  p p .  11- 1 2 .  
p .  1 2 .  
29.The Middle E a s t  i n  Crisis : Problems and Prospe c t s ,  . ..2.E.· c i t . , 
30" 
3 1  
Ibid . , p .  11.  
Charles Yos t ,  "The Arab Israeli War: How It Began, "  
Approaches to Peace in the Middle Ea s t ,  Hearings, 92nd Congres s ,  
2nd Session, 1 9 7 2 ,  p .  1 1 5 .  
3 2  
Iyad, .22 · cit . , P ;  5 3 .  
33 
2 3 .  Maksoud, .22 · cit . , p . 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Sharabi, .22 · c i t . , p .  1 8 5 .  
Kuroda ,  .22 · £...!.!;. ,  p .  2 5 6 .  
The New York Time s ,  June 2 5 ,  1 9 7 3 ,  p .  23.  
Iyad, -22 · c i t . , p .  5 1 .  
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
.· 
The Validity of Our Initial Propositions, 
and the Future of the Resistance 
According to our findings throughout this thes is , we may 
conclude the following observations a s  they pertain to our initial 
propositions : 
1 .  We proposed that in a very well -establ ished system, a 
government may become unrepresentative and ultimately illegitimate 
if it does not espouse people ' s  values and beliefs ' system, and i f  
a l ienation between the government and the people pers ists . 
The Palestinians have not been integrated into the social and 
political system imposed by Israe l . The state of Is rael was establ ished 
by a majority of non-Palestinian origin, representing an exclus ive ethnic-
rel igious minority of the indigenous population of Pales tine . The period 
preceding the establishment of the State of Israel was characterized by 
a heritage of killings and hate between Palestinian Arabs and Zionists .  
Both Palestinian factions were fighting the mandatory power during 
which the minority (the Zionist Palestinian faction) seized upon the 
opportunity to expel the majority of the other faction ( the Palestinian 
Arabs) in order to become the majority of the state they advocated. 
S ince more than 50 percent of the population of Israel , directly after 
and within a few months of its establishmen t ,  were not of Palestinian 
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origin, and s ince the establishment of their own state ended with the 
expulsion of the ma jority of the indigenous population, the Palestinain 
Arab expellees viewed the new order as a l ien and therefore colonial in 
essence. The remaining Palestinians became a minority in the new state , 
but considered themselves a part of the greater Palestinian population. 
A colonial order was neither representative of the indigenous popula­
t ion nor legitimate in their eyes . Accordingly ,  the state of Israel 
was neither representative of Palestinians nor legitimate in their own 
eyes , because it did not belong to them, nor did it espouse their 
values and beliefs or represent their interes ts . 
2 .  We proposed that if a state system tends to keep certain 
groups from participating in i t ,  and if these groups do not desire to 
participate in the system (maybe in hope for changing it) , the results 
may be uncontrollable tension. 
The Palestinians who remained in Israel after 1 948 , do not have 
equal rights with the rest o f  the Israeli citizens . The Israeli cop­
stitution, deliberately, contains restriction against the Pulestinians 
in I s rael (or the Israel i-Arabs) . In general ,  the Arabs of I�rael are 
treated as second-class citizens and kept under strict measures . The 
harshness of these measures keeps tens ion under control o The Arabs 
have adapted to a situation where they can express their discontent 
in literary fonns and render intell igence services to the Palestine 
Resistance headquarters that are located outside Israel . 
Palestinian groups that l ive outside Israel have been denied 
the right of returning to their homeland . The Israeli denial of these 
rights has created an a tmosphere with which the Palestinian refugees 
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have organized their efforts behind different organizations advocating 
and supporting a rmed struggle a s  the only means to redress their 
grievances . 
3 .  Our proposition of the nega tive impact which an organiza­
tion may be saddled with whenever it comprises different factions with 
contradicting approaches and ideologies may be very true o f  the Pale-
_ s t ine Resistance Movement . Six years of inter-re s istance conflicts 
did not strengthen the Resistance . On the contrary, the inability of 
the groups to unify their efforts rendered the Resistance ineffective 
and weakened it against the pressures o f  the regimes surrounding it . 
4 .  We proposed that the assertion o f  the need of a c quiring a 
country-identity may be a prime factor behind armed resistance where 
the socio-economic conditions come second in importance. The determina­
tion to acquire " country-identity" will eventually generate vioience 
especially if there exist conflicts of interests between two groups . 
In this kind o f  s ituation, violence may lead to goal atta inment , a�o­
l ition of the group , perpetuation of the existing state of affairs , 
or a compromise. 
Previous research findings in the social s ciences suggest that 
violence and political revolutions come about primarily because of 
social and economic conditions . The findings also tell us that the 
" • • •  need for establ ishing the identity or selfhood . • .  and the need for 
self-actualization" are at the heart of any individual ' s  behavior and 
therefore any population. 1 
We cannot be certain, however ,  whether or not the socio -economic 
conditions of Palestinians are behind their present orientations , but 
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we know that the principle of " country-identity" has been dominating 
the minds of Palestinians throughout their diaspora (see ft . 35, ch . 5 
above) • 
Why is there so much emphasis on the political s ide o f  the : 
.· 
problem? Aside from the needs for establ ishing identity or selfhood 
and for self-actua l ization, the whole problem and even the present 
socio-economic state of a(fairs among Palest inians were caused by 
political decisions . The Balfour Declaration, the mandate system, 
and the Partition Plan were a l l  political a c t ions that led , among 
other things , to Palestinian expulsion. Even when they were under 
British rule, Palestinians did not suffer a s  severe social and eco-
nomic consequences as at present . Presently, therefore , Palestinians 
are most l ikely to be influenced only by the values they place on 
restoring their country -identity. These values , however ,  do not 
el iminate the possibility that Palestinians think that once they 
acquire their identity, the solution to other problems would be in 
process . Furthermore, Palestinians a rgue that they are fighting a 
nationalist war ,  along which the value and belief system of Palestin-
ians has been based. Therefore , a nationa list war has clear political 
connotations a s  far a s  Palestinians are concerne d .  
The national is t  orientations of the Palestine Resistance come 
in conflict with the Israeli interes ts , creating a continuous state o f  
upheaval i n  the Middle Eas t .  Thu s ,  we may conclude that the pr ime goal 
of the resistance has not been attained, and the resistance could not 
induce Israel to compromise . Israel , on the other hand, cannot yet 
abolish the resistance . What seems as a natural consequence , then, 
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is that the s ituation w i l l  continue , though it is not known to what 
extent . 
5 .  The Palestine a rmed resistance started with the hope of 
a rriving at its ultimate goa l . That is , to " liberate" Palestine . 
. • 
(This , however ,  does not sugge s t ,  if we consider Fateh ' s  proposed 
s t ructure of the new s t a t e ,  for instance, that l iberating Palest ine 
means doing away with the Israeli population.) 
The process of liberating Palestine mus t meet some precond i -
tions , or short term goa l s . These short-term goals generated counter-
resistance from the Israel i ' s .  The Is raeli reprisals on the bases of 
the resis tance wherever it is located causes more restrictions on the 
resistance. Since the resis tance is s t i l l  a l ive , these restrictions 
may prove to be dangerou s . The resistance, however ,  presumes that the 
more pressure that comes from Israel , the more the resis tance gains 
momentum. A lthough this has occurred at times , the official a ttempts 
by the host governments show that this hypothes i s  may not be true. 
We may conclude that it is true that organized a rmed resis tance arises 
to accomplish specific goa l s , yet its success or failure is directly 
connected to the counter-measures it creates and their effectiveness 
as opposed to the determination, strength , and the environmental cir-
cumstances of the resistance. 
Let us try now to project what might be the future of the 
Palestine resis tance . To do this , we will be looking at the res i s t -
ance in terms o f  the outcome of the interactions of "res istance-
counter-resistance" as well as the environmental factors affecting the 
Palestine resistance . 
The Future of the Movement 
The Israeli regime , so far, is determined not to come to 
terms with the Res istance, but rather liquidate' it . A l s o ,  the 
Arab governments are containing t_t1e Movement within confined geo­
graphic limits , and in some countries , the Movement does not have 
any apparent organized structure . In addition, there are still 
different organizations with different approaches for achieving 
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the Movement ' s  goa l .  In this kind of situation, how effective is 
the Palestine Resis tance , and how may it be a f fecting the future o f  
Israel and vice-versai We w i l l  explore the extent of this question 
within the context of our proposition which states that organized 
a rmed resistance arises to accomplish specific goals . Consequently, 
counter-res istance is a imed a t  quieting the forces of res itance and 
dismantling their sources of support . 
The Movement ' s  Effects on the Middle East 
For the last six years the Palestine Resistance Movement has 
been influencing events in the Middle Eas t .  This influence has been 
affecting the functions o f  governments ,  and therefore the societies 
on three different levels ; in the Arab countries where the Resistance 
forms a considerable force, in Israel , and both countries are influencing 
the shape and form of the Movement itse l f .  
Its Effects on the Arab Countries 
The effects of the Movement on the Arab countries manifest 
themselves in different ways: 
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1 .  The Movement refused the Rogers ' peace initiative and also 
King Hus s e in ' s  proposal to Israel about a Palestinian state within the 
Jordanian Kingdom. They a l s o  wa rned against any such proposals and 
negotiations stressing the notion that only Palestinians can decide 
their own destiny. 2 
2 .  The Movement has been a decisive factor in inter-Arab 
relationships a long which agreements and disagreements have been 
voiced. 
3 .  Particularly in Jordan and Lebanon, the Movement created 
new events and shaped policies accordingly .  
The last two ways in which the Movement a ffects the Arab 
countries do not need any pa rticular reference . The breakdown of the 
diplomatic relations between several Arab states and Jordan after the 
so-called Amman massacre of 1 9 7 0 ,  and the governmental crisis in 
Lebanon are conmon knowledge . 
The Movement ' s  Effects on I s rael 
It may be uncertain whether the Movement will a ffect the future 
of the State o f  Israel as an entity, but there is no doubt that presently 
the Movement is affecting Israel in the following areas: 
1 .  The growing activities o f  the Movement have compelled Israel 
to raise its defense budget significantly. 
a .  Although Israel receives mill ions of dollars of contri­
butions from abroad every yea r ,  presently it spends about 25 percent o f  
i t s  GNP on defense a s  compared t o  about 10 percent in the early s ixties . 3 
This suggests that a significant amount o f  money is used on military· 
expenditures where it could have been spent on development . This 
const i tutes a burden on the Israeli economy .
4 
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b .  The growing effectiveness of the Movement has caused 
5 
Is rael to keep a large standing army on alert . 
. · 
2 .  The Movement costs Israel a considerable loss in manpower 
and human lives that did not prevail prior to the Movement ' s  existence . 
3 .  The Movement is contribut ing to gradual awareness among 
the Israelis o f  the injustices done to the Palestinians ; and the 
morality o f  Zionism a s  taught to them by their official representatives 
has been questioned . 6 Also , it has been a cknowledged in some official 
c i rcles , one o f  which comes from the Secretary General of the Israeli 
Labor Party (the largest party in I s rael) : 
" . • •  The Palestinian nation is identifiable as a national 
entity by national consciousness , by continuous territory 
where most of the Palestinians l ive , by a history of 
several decades replete with battles and wars , and a 
diaspora which maintains a link with the Palestinian 
homeland. At the same time it is conscious of a common 
national catastrohpe, sacrifice, suffering, heroes . I t  
h a s  dreams and the start o f  a national l iterature and 
poetry . "7 
4 .  " • . .  Israel , so f a r ,  has been a democracy, but i t  is moving 
towards a garrison state . . .  Yet the force o f  circumstances is pushing 
Israel in that direction, and this , inevitably will degrade its 
national life .118 
The Effects of Is rael and the Arab Regimes on the Movement 
I t  seems that the lack of a unified Palestinian leadership had 
a negative effect on the degree of effectiveness displayed by the Move-
ment . It also seems that after each round of repression of the Movement, 
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the Members of the leadership draw closer to each other. That is , a 
conversion towards establishing a collective leadership comprising 
the d ifferent organizat ions may be in its final step . 
In the post-September, 1970 events of Jordan, a loose under-
s tanding among the different leaders came about. A l s o ,  it seems now, 
after the May, 1 9 7 3  events of Lebanon that the leaders - -Arafat and 
Habash--who were " . . .  once bitter riva l s , have pulled Fateh and the 
Popular Front together in an a l l i ance that verges on merger. ' Ide­
ology is a cosme t i c '  is becoming the catch -phras e . 11 9 This latest 
a ccord between the two extremes of the Movement may mean, among other 
things , that an organizat ion which is based on alien ideological ground 
does not have but insignificant support a s  opposed to an organization 
functioning a ccording to nationa l is t  aspirations . In other words , 
the PFLP accord with Fateh, preceded by merger of most sma l l  organi-
zat ions with Fateh, s i gnify that Fateh, the most prominent group in 
the Movement , is appeal ing to the Palest inians because of its indeP.end-
ent nationa l i s t  outlook . 
A l though merger of smaller organizations into larger and well-
established one s ,  and cooperation among the larger ones may be leading 
towards a unified Pales t inian leadership, what goals may armed resist-
ance be able to accomplish in the face of the Israeli determination to 
l i quidate the Resistance and the Arab States determination to contain 
it? Again, what can ar�ed resis tance a ccomplish in the face of " . . .  
the intelligence services of Isra e l , Jordan, America , perhaps other 
countries too , "  to suppress it? lO 
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Recent history provides us with a lesson to cons ider . I t  is 
that if a resistance movement perpetuates and functions along a con­
tinuum, where it transforms from few individual s  to few groups , to 
s trong organizations , and then to . an entire societal front where 
everybody knows his place and contributes accordingly ,  there would be 
no power to stop this sort o f  human determina tion. The Kenyan, the 
Algerian, the Vietnamese revolut ions are some examples to consider. 
The Palestinian consciousness is now beyond containment . 
This has been proven by the fact that the more the Movement comes 
under pressure the more compromise and accord among the d i fferent 
factions exists , and therefore , the more organized and s t ronger it 
becomes . The s trength of the Movement, howeve r ,  is a lways supplied 
by the young and the old , by the very well educated and those who are 
poorly educated because they . a l l  were once , if they are not now ; the 
product of refuge and abandonment where the politics of despair were 
nurtured . In the refugee camp s ,  their hate and revenge are " . . .  easily 
fed by all the old memories o f  villages . razed, houses and graves plowed 
unde r . "  In a condition such as tha t ,  and in s ituations where they have 
been driven to extremes , the Palestinians " . . • seem to feel in the night­
mare of their lonelines s - -bombs , horro r ,  death - - is better than being 
11 
swirled away unheeded down the caverns of the world ' s  indifference . "  
Maybe now more than ever before , the Pales tinians are acting a s  
a group that will eventually react with a full potential t o  defend not 
only their survival needs , as a community, but also to protect what they 
have acquired until the present time . In this kind of s ituation, they 
are capable of destroying any socia l ,  economic ,  and political system in 
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the Arab Middle East .  In the end, however, the winner in such a 
show-down will be the government ' s  forces ,  but this will end before 
dissolving the Movement .  What then may happen is that even the 
modera tes will become Black Septemberists . Then, not only their 
direct environment would have much to fear, but also the inter-
national community as wel l .  
What is , then, the solution? 
" • . .  In Israel and among that country ' s  supporters in 
the West the true nature of the conflict is obfuscated 
by the persistent belief that the crucial conflict is 
with Arab governments . . .  The initial cause of all these 
complicating disputes is not ' freedom of passage through 
international waterways , '  or ' recognition' by neighboring 
states , or other such peace agenda items . The root cause 
which led to these disputes is the loss of Palestinian 
Arab rights . . .  These are not the observations of an 
antagonist or foe of Israel , but of a friend . 1 11 3  
Unless the legitimate rights o f  the Palestinians are attained, 
the armed resitance will continue to grow and to be the focus o f  events 
in the Middle East for genera t ions . 
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APPE®IX I (A) 
Cities and Towns o f  Pales tine Where the Commission 
Met with Delegates and Repre sentatives 
Acre 
Beersheba - (Ga�a) Bethelehem 
Haifa 
Hebron 
Jaffa (Ludd , Ramleh) 
Jenin 
Jerusalem 
Nablus 
Nazareth (Safed, Tiberias) 
Ramallah 
Richon- le-Sion 
Tel-a-Viv 
Adapted from: "Report of American Section of Inter­
Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey: An Official 
United States Government Repor t , "  Editor and Pub­
lisher, LXXV, December 2 ,  192 2 .  
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APPENDIX I (B) 
Number of Palestinian Delegations that Met w i th the Commiss ion by 
Grou s 
Groups No. o f  Delegations 
I .  Political Groups 
1 .  Mayors and Municipal Counc ils 
2 .  Administrative Councils 
3 .  Counc ils o f  Village Chiefs 
4 .  Arab Sheikhs 
5 .  Arab Societies 
6. Moslem Christian Committees 
Total 
12 
2 
22 
6 
2 
3 
47 
�II. Economic and Social Groups 
I I I .  
1 .  Profesions and Trades 
2 .  Farmers , etc. 
3 .  Young Men ' s Clubs 
4. Chambers of Commerce 
5 .  Miscellaneous Groups 
Total 
Religious Groups 
A .  Christians 
1. General Christi�n 
2 .  Protestants 
3 .  Latins 
4 .  Greek Orthodox 
s .  Greek Catholics 
6 .  Maronites 
7 .  Armenians (General 
8 .  Syrian Catholics 
9 .  Chaldean Catholics 
10. Cop ts 
1 1 .  Abys_sinians 
Total 
B .  Moslems 
1 .  Muftis and Ulema 
2 .  Moslem Notables 
3 .  Moslem Sunnites 
Total 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
Groups (Composite) 7 
9 
9 
7 
8 
7 
Groups) 1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
5 3  
7 
2 
9 
18 
c. Other Religious Groups 
1 .  Jews 
2 .  Druses 
3 .  Samaritans 
4 .  Persians 
Total 
Grand Total 
14 
1 
1 
1 
17 
140 
Adapted from: "Report o f  American Section of Inter-Allied Commission 
on Mandates in Turkey : An Official United States Government Report , "  
Editor and Publisher, LXXV, December 2 ,  1922. 
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APPENDIX II 
Jewish Immigrat ion to Palest�ne by Year and 
Percentage 
Year 
1 920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1 9 24 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1 940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
No . of Immigrants 
5 , 514 
9 , 149 
7 , 844 
7 ,421 
12 ,856 
3 3 , 801 
1 3 , 081 
2 , 7 1 3  
2 , 178 
5 , 249 
4 , 944 
4 , 075 
9 , 553 
30 , 326 
42 , 358 
6 1 , 854 
2 9 , 7 27 
1 0 , 536 
1 2 , 868 
27 , 561 
1 0 , 445 
3 , 8 3 9  
3 , 581 
8 , 558 
14,491 
1 3 , 156 
Percent 
1 1 . 1  
11 . 7 
11 . 8  
14 . 4  
1 6 . 6  
1 6 . 3  
1 6 . 2  
1 6 . 3  
1 6 . 6  
1 6 . 9  
17 . 9  
20 . 6  
2 3 . 4  
27 . 2  
28 . 1  
28 . 2  
28 . 7  
2 9 . 7  
30 .0 
2 9 . 9  
2 9 . 9  
30 . 0  
30 .4 
30 . 6  
*Percent o f  the Jewish populat ion o f  the 
total population of Pa l e s t ine . 
Source : Elias S a a d ,  Alhijral Yahoudiya ila 
Filistin, ("The Jewish Immigration 
to Palestine ,") (Beirut: The P a ­
lestine Liberation Organization Re­
sea rch Center ,  1969) , p p .  37-38 . 
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